Financial institutions

• The Impact of Liquidity on Bank Profitability

  Staff Working Paper 2010-38 Étienne Bordeleau, Christopher Graham

  The recent crisis has underlined the importance of sound bank liquidity management. In response, regulators are devising new liquidity standards with the aim of making the financial system more stable and resilient. In this paper, the authors analyse the impact of liquid asset holdings on bank profitability for a sample of large U.S. and Canadian banks.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G3, G32, G33

• The Macroeconomic Implications of Changes in Bank Capital and Liquidity Requirements in Canada: Insights from the BoC-GEM-FIN

  Staff Discussion Paper 2010-16 Carlos De Resende, Ali Dib, Nikita Perevalov

  The authors use simulations within the BoC-GEM-FIN, the Bank of Canada's version of the Global Economy Model with financial frictions in both the demand and supply sides of the credit market, to investigate the macroeconomic implications of changing bank regulations on the Canadian economy.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Economic models, Financial institutions, Financial stability, International topics JEL Code(s): E, E3, E32, E4, E44, E5, G, G1, G2

• Adverse Selection, Liquidity, and Market Breakdown

  Staff Working Paper 2010-32 Koralai Kirabaeva

  This paper studies the interaction between adverse selection, liquidity risk and beliefs about systemic risk in determining market liquidity, asset prices and welfare. Even a small amount of adverse selection in the asset market can lead to fire-sale pricing and possibly to a market breakdown if it is accompanied by a flight-to-liquidity, a misassessment of systemic risk, or uncertainty about asset values.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial stability JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, G, G0, G01, G1, G11

• Losses from Simulated Defaults in Canada's Large Value Transfer System

  Staff Discussion Paper 2010-14 Nellie Zhang, Tom Hossfeld

  The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) loss-sharing mechanism was designed to ensure that, in the event of a one-participant default, the collateral pledged by direct members of the system would be sufficient to cover the largest possible net debit position of a defaulting participant. However, the situation may not hold if the indirect effects of the defaults are taken into consideration, or if two participants default during the same payment cycle.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E47, G, G2, G21