James Chapman - Latest

• Which Bank is the "Central" Bank? An Application of Markov Theory to the Canadian Large Value Transfer System

  Staff Working Paper 2008-42 Morten Bech, James Chapman, Rodney J. Garratt

  We use a method similar to Google's PageRank procedure to rank banks in the Canadian Large Value Transfer System (LVTS). Along the way we obtain estimates of the payment processing speeds for the individual banks.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C1, C11, E, E5, E50, G, G2, G20

• Liquidity Efficiency and Distribution in the LVTS: Non-Neutrality of System Changes under Network Asymmetry

  Staff Discussion Paper 2008-11 Sean O'Connor, James Chapman, Kirby Millar

  The authors consider the liquidity efficiency of Tranche 2 of the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS T2) by examining, through an empirical analysis, some plausible strategic reactions of individual participants to a systemwide shock to available liquidity in the system.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, L, L1, L13, L14
• June 21, 2008

  A Model of Tiered Settlement Networks

  Financial System Review - June 2008 James Chapman, Jonathan Chiu, Miguel Molico

  Content Type(s): Publications, Financial System Review articles

• Policy Coordination in an International Payment System

  Staff Working Paper 2008-17 James Chapman

  Given the increasing interdependence of both financial systems and attendant payment and settlement systems a vital question is what form should optimal policy take when there are two connected payment systems with separate regulators.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Exchange rate regimes, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E42, E5, E58, F, F3, F31, F33

• A Model of Tiered Settlement Networks

  Staff Working Paper 2008-12 James Chapman, Jonathan Chiu, Miguel Molico

  This paper develops a model of settlement system to study the endogenous structure of settlement networks, and the welfare consequences of clearing agent failure. The equilibrium degree of tiering is endogenously determined by the cost structure and the information structure.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E42, E5, E58, G, G2, G21