Credibility

• Inflation Targeting and Liquidity Traps Under Endogenous Credibility

  Staff Working Paper 2019-9 Cars Hommes, Joep Lustenhouwer

  Policy implications are derived for an inflation-targeting central bank, whose credibility is endogenous and depends on its past ability to achieve its targets. This is done in a New Keynesian framework with heterogeneous and boundedly rational expectations.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Credibility, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): C, C6, C62, E, E3, E32, E5, E52
• February 21, 2019

  Price check: Inflation in Canada

  Sharon Kozicki, Jill Vardy, Laurence Savoie-Chabot

  Why prices change, and what it means for the economy.

  Content Type(s): Publications, The Economy, Plain and Simple Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Credibility, Expectations, Inflation and prices, Inflation targets, Inflation: costs and benefits, Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy transmission, Price stability