J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs

• Wage Dynamics and Returns to Unobserved Skill

  Staff Working Paper 2017-61 Lance Lochner, Youngmin Park, Youngki Shin

  Economists disagree about the factors driving the substantial increase in residual wage inequality in the U.S. over the past few decades. We identify and estimate a general model of log wage residuals that incorporates: (i) changing returns to unobserved skills, (ii) a changing distribution of unobserved skills, and (iii) changing volatility in wages due to factors unrelated to skills.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Labour markets JEL Code(s): C, C2, C23, J, J2, J24, J3, J31

• Wage Growth in Canada and the United States: Factors Behind Recent Weakness

  Staff Analytical Note 2017-8 Dany Brouillette, James Ketcheson, Olena Kostyshyna, Jonathan Lachaine

  This note examines the relatively subdued pace of wage growth in Canada since the commodity price decline in 2014 and assesses whether the weakness is attributable to cyclical (e.g., labour market slack) or structural factors (e.g., resource reallocation and demographic change).

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Labour markets, Recent economic and financial developments JEL Code(s): E, E2, E24, J, J3, J30

• Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity, Inflation and Unemployment: New Evidence Using Micro‐Level Data

  Staff Analytical Note 2017-6 Dany Brouillette, Natalia Kyui

  Recent evidence suggests that the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) in the Canadian labour market has risen following the 2008–09 recession (see Brouillette, Kostyshyna and Kyui 2016).

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Inflation and prices, Labour markets JEL Code(s): E, E2, E24, E3, E31, J, J3, J30

• Constrained Efficiency with Adverse Selection and Directed Search

  Staff Working Paper 2017-15 Mohammad Davoodalhosseini

  Constrained efficient allocation (CE) is characterized in a model of adverse selection and directed search (Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010)). CE is defined to be the allocation that maximizes welfare, the ex-ante utility of all agents, subject to the frictions of the environment.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, D83, E, E2, E24, G, G1, J, J3, J31, J6, J64