G23 - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

• How foreign central banks can affect liquidity in the Government of Canada bond market

  Staff Analytical Note 2024-26 Patrick Aldridge, Jabir Sandhu, Sofia Tchamova

  We find that foreign central banks own a large share of Government of Canada (GoC) bonds and tend to hold their positions for longer than other types of asset managers. This buy-and-hold behaviour could offer benefits. For example, foreign central banks may be less likely than other asset managers to sell bonds and add to strains on market liquidity in periods of turmoil. However, foreign central banks’ buy-and-hold behaviour combined with their minimal lending of GoC bonds in securities-financing markets, as observed in our available data, can potentially lower liquidity because fewer GoC bonds are available for others to transact in secondary markets. Indeed, we find that higher levels of foreign central banks’ GoC bond holdings are related to lower liquidity.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Exchange rates, Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial stability, Foreign reserves management, International financial markets, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, F, F3, F30, F31, G, G0, G01, G1, G11, G12, G15, G2, G23

• Could all-to-all trading improve liquidity in the Government of Canada bond market?

  Staff Analytical Note 2024-17 Jabir Sandhu, Rishi Vala

  We find that on any given day, nearly half of Government of Canada bond transactions by clients of dealers can be offset with other clients, including during the turmoil in March 2020. Our results show that under certain conditions clients could potentially trade directly with each other and are a step towards understanding the relevance of broader all-to-all trading in the Government of Canada bond market.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Coronavirus disease (COVID-19), Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial stability, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D47, D5, D53, G, G0, G01, G1, G12, G13, G14, G2, G21, G23

• How big is cash-futures basis trading in Canada’s government bond market?

  Staff Analytical Note 2024-16 Andreas Uthemann, Rishi Vala

  Cash-futures basis trading has grown alongside the Government of Canada bond futures market. We examine this growth over time in relation to Government of Canada bond and repurchase agreement markets and provide details on the type of market participants that engage in this type of trading activity.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial stability, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D47, D5, D53, G, G1, G12, G2, G23

• Non-bank financial intermediation: Canada’s submission to the 2023 global monitoring report

  Staff Analytical Note 2024-15 Malcolm Fisher, Alan Walsh

  We share insights from Canadian data from 2002 to 2022 that the Bank of Canada collected. The Bank submits these data each year to the Financial Stability Board for inclusion in its Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Financial institutions, Sectoral balance sheet JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G22, G23

• Central Bank Liquidity Policy in Modern Times

  Staff Discussion Paper 2024-6 Skylar Brooks

  Across several dimensions of lender of last resort policy, I highlight broad changes that have occurred since the 2008–09 global financial crisis and discuss some of the key challenges, choices and considerations facing the designers of central bank liquidity tools today.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Central bank research, Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial stability, Lender of last resort JEL Code(s): D, D5, D53, E, E5, E58, E6, E61, G, G0, G01, G2, G21, G23, H, H1, H12

• Fire Sales and Liquidity Requirements

  Staff Working Paper 2024-18 Yuteng Cheng, Roberto Robatto

  We study liquidity requirements in a framework with fire sales. The framework nests three common pricing mechanisms and produces the same observables. Absent risk-sharing considerations, the equilibrium is efficient with cash-in-the-market pricing; a liquidity requirement is optimal with second-best-use pricing; and a liquidity ceiling (i.e., a cap on liquid assets) is optimal with adverse selection.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Asset pricing, Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G1, G12, G2, G23, G28

• Liquidity risks at Canadian life insurance companies

  Staff Analytical Note 2024-7 Patrick Aldridge, Stephane Gignac, Rishi Vala, Adrian Walton

  We examine how life insurers manage liquidity risks created by their business model. We find that Canadian life insurers did not face significant liquidity draws and continued their usual investment behaviour during the COVID-19 crisis and as interest rates increased in 2022.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Coronavirus disease (COVID-19), Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial stability, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D47, D5, D53, G, G1, G12, G14, G2, G23