G2 - Financial Institutions and Services

• Decentralized finance: Innovations and challenges

  Staff Analytical Note 2023-15 Jonathan Chiu, Hanna Yu

  Decentralized finance surged in popularity around 2020. We explore its value and limitations and highlight some potential regulatory concerns.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Research Topic(s): Digital currencies and fintech, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G1, G2

• Estimating the Appropriate Quantity of Settlement Balances in a Floor System

  Staff Discussion Paper 2023-26 Narayan Bulusu, Matthew McNeely, Kaetlynd McRae, Jonathan Witmer

  This paper presents two complementary approaches to estimating the appropriate quantity of settlement balances needed to effectively operate monetary policy under a floor system in Canada.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies, Monetary policy implementation, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E41, E42, E5, E52, E58, G, G2, G21, G28

• Three things we learned about the Lynx payment system

  Staff Analytical Note 2023-14 Nikil Chande, Zhentong Lu, Hiru Rodrigo, Phoebe Tian

  Canada transitioned to a new wholesale payment system, Lynx, in August 2021. Lynx is based on a real-time settlement model that eliminates credit risk in the system. This model can require more liquidity; however, Lynx’s design allows Canada’s wholesale payments to settle efficiently.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services, Financial system regulation and policies, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C1, C10, E, E4, E42, G, G2, G28

• Intermediary Market Power and Capital Constraints

  Staff Working Paper 2023-51 Jason Allen, Milena Wittwer

  We examine how intermediary capitalization affects asset prices in a framework that allows for intermediary market power. We introduce a model in which capital-constrained intermediaries buy or trade an asset in an imperfectly competitive market, and we show that weaker capital constraints lead to both higher prices and intermediary markups.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D40, D44, G, G1, G12, G18, G2, G20, L, L1, L10