G10 - General

• Financial Crisis Resolution

  Staff Working Paper 2012-42 Josef Schroth

  This paper studies a dynamic version of the Holmstrom-Tirole model of intermediated finance. I show that competitive equilibria are not constrained efficient when the economy experiences a financial crisis. A pecuniary externality entails that banks’ desire to accumulate capital over time aggravates the scarcity of informed capital during the financial crisis.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): D, D5, D53, E, E6, E60, G, G0, G01, G1, G10, G18
• November 15, 2012

  Financial Transaction Taxes: International Experiences, Issues and Feasibility

  Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2012 Anna Pomeranets

  The financial transaction tax (FTT) is a policy idea with a long history that, in the wake of the global financial crisis, has attracted renewed interest in some quarters. This article examines the evidence of the impact of an FTT on market quality and explores a few of the practical issues surrounding the implementation of an FTT. Proponents argue that an FTT will generate substantial tax revenues and reduce market volatility. The majority of the empirical evidence, however, supports the arguments of opponents of the tax who assert that an FTT reduces volume and liquidity and increases volatility. In addition, there are numerous challenges in implementing an FTT, which may reduce the intended revenues. Whether an FTT is beneficial hinges on its effect on market quality and its ability to raise revenues. However, there are many unanswered questions regarding its design.

  Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G0, G01, G1, G10, G18

• When Lower Risk Increases Profit: Competition and Control of a Central Counterparty

  Staff Working Paper 2012-35 Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Héctor Pérez Saiz, Joshua Slive

  We model the behavior of dealers in Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives markets where a small number of dealers trade with a continuum of heterogeneous clients (hedgers). Imperfect competition and (endogenous) default induce a familiar trade-off between competition and risk.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G1, G10, G18