G - Financial Economics

• A Counterfactual Valuation of the Stock Index as a Predictor of Crashes

  Staff Working Paper 2017-38 Tom Roberts

  Stock market fundamentals would not seem to meaningfully predict returns over a shorter-term horizon—instead, I shift focus to severe downside risk (i.e., crashes).

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Asset pricing, Financial stability JEL Code(s): G, G0, G01, G1, G12, G17, G19

• The MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework (MFRAF), Version 2.0

  Technical Report No. 111 Jose Fique

  This report provides a detailed technical description of the updated MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework (MFRAF), which replaces the version described in Gauthier, Souissi and Liu (2014) as the Bank of Canada’s stress-testing model for banks with a focus on domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs).

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Technical reports Topic(s): Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): C, C7, C72, E, E5, E58, G, G0, G01, G2, G21, G28

• The Rise of Non-Regulated Financial Intermediaries in the Housing Sector and its Macroeconomic Implications

  Staff Working Paper 2017-36 Hélène Desgagnés

  I examine the impact of non-regulated lenders in the mortgage market using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. My model features two types of financial intermediaries that differ in three ways: (i) only regulated intermediaries face a capital requirement, (ii) non-regulated intermediaries finance themselves by selling securities and cannot accept deposits, and (iii) non-regulated intermediaries face a more elastic demand.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Economic models, Financial system regulation and policies, Housing JEL Code(s): E, E3, E32, E4, E44, E47, E6, E60, G, G2, G21, G23, G28

• Do Canadian Broker-Dealers Act as Agents or Principals in Bond Trading?

  Staff Analytical Note 2017-11 Daniel Hyun, Jesse Johal, Corey Garriott

  Technology, risk tolerance and regulation may influence dealers to reduce their trading as principals (using their own balance sheets for sales and purchases of securities) in favour of agency trading (matching client trades).

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing, Recent economic and financial developments JEL Code(s): G, G1, G14, G2, G20, L, L1