C9 - Design of Experiments

• Monetary Payoff and Utility Function in Adaptive Learning Models

  Staff Working Paper 2019-50 Erhao Xie

  When players repeatedly face an identical or similar game (e.g., coordination game, technology adoption game, or product choice game), they may learn through experience to perform better in the future. This learning behaviour has important economic implications.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C5, C57, C7, C72, C9, C92

• The Formation of House Price Expectations in Canada: Evidence from a Randomized Information Experiment

  Staff Analytical Note 2019-24 Marc-André Gosselin, Mikael Khan, Matthieu Verstraete

  We conduct a randomized information experiment leveraging the Canadian Survey of Consumer Expectations. We provide causal evidence that respondents revise both their short- and medium-term expectations of future house price growth in a way that is consistent with observed short-term momentum in house prices. However, empirically, house price growth tends to revert to its mean in the medium term.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Financial stability, Housing JEL Code(s): C, C9, D, D8, D84, R, R2, R21

• Are Long-Horizon Expectations (De-)Stabilizing? Theory and Experiments

  Staff Working Paper 2019-27 George Evans, Cars Hommes, Isabelle Salle, Bruce McGough

  Most models in finance assume that agents make trading plans over the infinite future. We consider instead that they are boundedly rational and may only form forecasts over a limited horizon.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Asset pricing, Central bank research, Economic models, Financial markets JEL Code(s): C, C9, C92, D, D8, D84, E

• Central Bank Communication That Works: Lessons from Lab Experiments

  Staff Working Paper 2019-21 Oleksiy Kryvtsov, Luba Petersen

  We use controlled laboratory experiments to test the causal effects of central bank communication on economic expectations and to distinguish the underlying mechanisms of those effects. In an experiment where subjects learn to forecast economic variables, we find that central bank communication has a stabilizing effect on individual and aggregate outcomes and that the size of the effect varies with the type of communication.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Monetary policy implementation, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): C, C9, D, D8, D84, E, E3, E5, E52