

# Foreign Banks and Macroeconomic Fluctuations: Evidence from Financially Integrated Emerging Markets

## **Discussion**

# ECB/Bank of Canada conference 8-9 June 2015

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#### Alistair Dieppe European Central Bank

## **Overview**

#### **1** Summary of paper

#### 2 Some comments

#### Study association between macroeconomic volatility and foreign banks

- Macroeconomic volatility depresses investment and hinders economic development
- Foreign banks have different exposure to external and domestic liquidity compare to domestic banks
  - > may imply different real effects :
    - Normal times: Foreign banks buffer idiosyncratic shocks or country-specific shocks due to diversification and access to foreign funds
    - Large scale and highly correlated shock: Foreign banks lose ability to absorb extreme shocks

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#### **Key Findings:**

- 1. Presence of foreign banks
  - Overall no significant effect on growth volatilities
  - Higher levels of financial developments amplified output and consumption growth volatilities
  - Lower levels of financial development mitigated investment volatilities.
- 2. During 2008/09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC)
  - Foreign banks lose ability to absorb extreme shocks.
  - > Depends on level of financial intermediary development
- 3. <u>Widespread variation (heterogenous) across regions</u>
  - Dampening volatility in Latin America
  - Magnified volatility in Asia
  - > No effect in Emerging Europe (significantly affected by GFC).

## **Overview**

#### 1 Summary of the paper

#### 2 Some comments

#### Exposure of (domestic) bank to abroad

- financing abilities, both assets & liabilities
- ➢ foreign banks funded through domestic deposits → mitigate volatility

#### Currency mismatch

- Iocal currency versus foreign currency funding & lending
- > domestic borrowers unhedged  $\rightarrow$  increase volatility

#### **Global financing**

- Share of stock market & bond market owned by foreigners
- Financing via cross-border corporations
- Non-bank private sector claims (FDI etc)

#### Are residuals a good measure of macroeconomic volatility?

	Table A.1. First Stage G.	Table A.1. First Stage Growth Panel Regressions			
Try 5-year moving average? -		Dependent Variable: Growth in Real			
		Private			
		GDP	Consumption	Investment	
	Intercept	40.464	112.015	316.857	
		(64.697)	(85.569)	(320.313)	
Estimate with GMM to address	Trade Openness	6.656 ***	6.501 ***	28.185 ***	
endogeneity?		(1.370)	(1.782)	(6.796)	
	Capital Flows to GDP	0.028	0.039	0.038	
		(0.047)	(0.062)	(0.234)	
	Unemployment Rate	-0.279 ***	-0.504 ***	-0.420	
		(0.100)	(0.133)	(0.480)	
Very few variables significant	Growth in Population	$\underbrace{0.017}_{(0.026)}$	0.003	1.218	
	Years in Secondary School	(0.836) $(4.445)$	(1.105) -1.401	(4.141)	
	Tears in Secondary School	(5.304)	(7.019)	(26.300)	
	External Debt to GDP	(3.304) -3.172 ***	-3.785 ***	-10.070 ***	
		(0.695)	(0.906)	(3.374)	
<b>NAL 1 ZL L L L L L L L L L</b>	Government to GDP	-0.517	-3.625 *	5.836	
Missing financial variables		(1.435)	(1.895)	(7.132)	
credit to GDP, interest rates etc	Log(Expected Life)	-13.181	-23.714	-86.586	
	/	(14.659)	(19.362)	(72.599)	
	Log(1+Inflation)	-4.393 ***	-8.439 ***	-14.231 **	
		(1.317)	(1.698)	(6.579)	
	Local Crisis Dummy	-5.131 ***	-4.863 ***	-23.702 ***	
Teo mony dummico?	-	(0.912)	(1.204)	(4.519)	
Too many dummies?	$Log(Growth)^{\dagger}_{-1}$	0.098 *	0.135 **	-0.052	
		(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.056)	
	Year and Country Fixed Effect		Yes	Yes	
Unexplained variance is high	Adjusted B <sup>2</sup>	0.555	0.462	0.304	
	F-statistic	10.180***	7.310 ***	4.210 ***	
	N	355	355	355	

#### Foreign Bank presence not exogenous to economic conditions

- Need to distinguish between faster growth from impact on volatility
- > Therefore control in first stage regression (Morgan & Strahan 2004)

#### Global Financial Crisis (2008/2009)

- Globalisation of banking enhanced the international transmission
- ➤ A large-scale highly correlated shock → Estimate panel with Common Correlated Effects (Pesaran 2006)

#### **Local Crisis dummy**

- > Too much focus on GFC (2008/09) look beyond
- Local crisis dummy (Laeven & Valencia 2012) excludes volatility due to banking, currency and sovereign debt crises between 1998-2011
- Does foreign bank involvement reduce number of crisis?

#### More controls in volatility equation

e.g. volatility due to commodities (Brazil), terms of trade, foreign demand, regulatory set-up etc.

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