Payment clearing and settlement systems
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A Model of Tiered Settlement Networks
This paper develops a model of settlement system to study the endogenous structure of settlement networks, and the welfare consequences of clearing agent failure. The equilibrium degree of tiering is endogenously determined by the cost structure and the information structure. -
March 16, 2008
Developing a Framework to Assess Financial Stability: Conference Highlights and Lessons
Central banks are still defining their approach to financial stability and are at an early stage in the development of useful models. The Bank of Canada's 2007 economic conference was organized to stimulate progress in the development of financial-stability frameworks. Among the highlights reported here are the discussions centred around three proposed frameworks: a contingent-claims-analysis framework, a semi-structural framework, and structural financial-stability models. Participants also reported on their experiences with stress-testing under the International Monetary Fund's Financial Sector Assessment Program and discussed the implications for financial stability of linkages among payment, clearing, and settlement systems. -
Rediscounting Under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard
Freeman (1999) proposes a model in which discount window lending and open market operations have different effects. This is important because in most of the literature, these policies are indistinguishable. -
Unanticipated Defaults and Losses in Canada's Large-Value Payments System, Revisited
Recent work at the Bank of Canada studied the impact of default in Canada’s large-value payments system, and concluded that participants could readily manage their potential losses (McVanel 2005). In an extension of that work, the authors use a much larger set of daily payments data – with three times as many observations – to […] -
April 13, 2007
The Large-Value Payments System: Insights from Selected Bank of Canada Research
Given the Bank of Canada's strong interest in the safe and efficient operation of major clearing and settlement systems, the Bank maintains a rigorous research agenda as a means of informing payments system policy and oversight. In this article, Arjani and Engert review recent research undertaken by Bank staff concerning the risk and efficiency of the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS). Based on the findings from this research, the authors conclude that the design of the LVTS strikes an effective balance between risk and efficiency. The article also demonstrates the increased use of simulation analysis as a tool for conducting payments system research. A brief summary of the Bank's oversight strategy for systemically important payments systems is also provided. Goals for future research are noted as well, including modelling of participant behaviour and continued external collaboration with other researchers. -
Modelling Payments Systems: A Review of the Literature
Payments systems play a fundamental role in an economy by providing the mechanisms through which payments arising from transactions can be settled. The existing literature on the economics of payments systems is large but loosely organized, in that each model uses a distinct set-up and sometimes a distinct equilibrium concept. -
Credit in a Tiered Payments System
Payments systems are typically characterized by some degree of tiering, with upstream firms (clearing agents) providing settlement accounts to downstream institutions that wish to clear and settle payments indirectly in these systems (indirect clearers). -
Examining the Trade-Off between Settlement Delay and Intraday Liquidity in Canada's LVTS: A Simulation Approach
The author explores a fundamental trade-off that occurs between settlement delay and intraday liquidity in the daily operation of large-value payment systems (LVPS), with specific application to Canada's Large Value Transfer System (LVTS). -
Risk-Cost Frontier and Collateral Valuation in Securities Settlement Systems for Extreme Market Events
The authors examine how the use of extreme value theory yields collateral requirements that are robust to extreme fluctuations in the market price of the asset used as collateral.