Debt management

• Entry and Exit in Treasury Auctions

  Staff Working Paper 2024-29 Jason Allen, Ali Hortaçsu, Eric Richert, Milena Wittwer

  This paper introduces and estimates a structural model of the Canadian primary market for government debt. We assess the role of dealer exit in this market as a key reason for increased, yet irregular, customer entry and quantify the benefits of greater customer competition against the costs of higher market volatility.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Debt management, Financial institutions, Financial markets, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D44, D47, G, G1, G12, G2, G28

• BoC–BoE Sovereign Default Database: What’s new in 2024?

  Staff Analytical Note 2024-19 David Beers, Obiageri Ndukwe, Alex Charron

  The BoC–BoE database of sovereign debt defaults, published and updated annually by the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England, provides comprehensive estimates of stocks of government obligations in default. The 2024 edition updates the historical data and revisits sovereign defaults on local currency debt.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Debt management, Development economics, Financial stability, International financial markets JEL Code(s): F, F3, F34, G, G1, G10, G14, G15

• The Macroeconomic Effects of Debt Relief Policies During Recessions

  Staff Working Paper 2023-48 Soyoung Lee

  A large-scale reduction in mortgage principal can strengthen a recovery, support house prices and lower foreclosures. The nature of the intervention shapes its impact, which rests on how resources are redistributed across households. The availability of bankruptcy on unsecured debt changes the response to large-scale mortgage relief by reducing precautionary savings.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Credit and credit aggregates, Debt management, Housing JEL Code(s): E, E2, E21, E3, E32, E6

• BoC–BoE Sovereign Default Database: What’s new in 2023?

  Staff Analytical Note 2023-10 David Beers, Obiageri Ndukwe, Karim McDaniels, Alex Charron

  The BoC–BoE database of sovereign debt defaults, published and updated annually by the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England, provides comprehensive estimates of stocks of government obligations in default. The 2023 edition includes a new section about the characteristics of sovereign defaults and provides new visuals showing regional debt in default.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Debt management, Development economics, Financial stability, International financial markets JEL Code(s): F, F3, F34, G, G1, G10, G14, G15

• BoC–BoE Sovereign Default Database: Appendix and References

  Technical Report No. 125 David Beers, Obiageri Ndukwe, Alex Charron

  Since 2014, the Bank of Canada (BoC) has maintained a comprehensive database of sovereign defaults to systematically measure and aggregate the nominal value of the different types of sovereign government debt in default. The database is posted on the BoC’s website and is updated annually in partnership with the Bank of England (BoE).

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Technical reports Topic(s): Debt management, Development economics, Financial stability, International financial markets JEL Code(s): F, F3, F34, G, G1, G10, G14, G15

• BoC–BoE Sovereign Default Database: Methodology and Assumptions

  Technical Report No. 124 David Beers, Obiageri Ndukwe, Alex Charron

  The Bank of Canada (BoC), in partnership with the Bank of England (BoE), developed a comprehensive database of sovereign defaults in 2014. The database is posted on the Bank of Canada’s website and updated annually. The BoC–BoE database draws on datasets published by various public and private sector sources. It combines elements of these, together with new information, to develop comprehensive estimates of stocks of government obligations in default.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Technical reports Topic(s): Debt management, Development economics, Financial stability, International financial markets JEL Code(s): F, F3, F34, G, G1, G10, G14, G15

• Estimating the Slope of the Demand Function at Auctions for Government of Canada Bonds

  Staff Discussion Paper 2023-12 Bo Young Chang

  We use bid data from Government of Canada bond auctions between 1999 and 2021 to gauge the yield sensitivity of these bonds to the issuance amount. Our new metric estimates the demand function of the bidders at each auction and offers insights into the relationship between supply and yield of government bonds.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Debt management, Interest rates JEL Code(s): D, D4, D44, G, G1, G12

• BoC–BoE Sovereign Default Database: What’s new in 2022?

  Staff Analytical Note 2022-11 David Beers, Elliot Jones, Karim McDaniels, Zacharie Quiviger

  The BoC–BoE database of sovereign debt defaults, published and updated annually by the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England, provides comprehensive estimates of stocks of government obligations in default.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Debt management, Development economics, Financial stability, International financial markets JEL Code(s): F, F3, F34, G, G1, G10, G14, G15
• February 2, 2022

  A Canadian interest rate benchmark regime for the future

  Remarks (delivered virtually) Toni Gravelle International Swaps and Derivatives Association New York, New York

  Deputy Governor Toni Gravelle discusses some important changes that may be coming to Canada’s interest rate benchmarks.

  Content Type(s): Press, Speeches and appearances, Remarks Topic(s): Debt management, Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies, Interest rates, Market structure and pricing

• Revisiting the Monetary Sovereignty Rationale for CBDCs

  Staff Discussion Paper 2021-17 Skylar Brooks

  One argument for central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) is that without them, private and foreign digital monies could displace domestic currencies, threatening the central bank’s monetary policy and lender of last resort capabilities. I revisit this monetary sovereignty rationale and offer a wider view—one that considers a broader set of currency functions and captures important cross-country variation.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Debt management, Digital currencies and fintech, Exchange rate regimes, Financial stability, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E4, E41, E42, E5, E52, E58, H, H1, H12, H6, H63