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303 Results

March 17, 2025

Will asset managers dash for cash? A summary of the implications for central banks

We consider ways central banks could adapt in the event of an increased risk of a dash for cash from asset managers. We explore ideas such as new facilities that ease asset managers’ ability to convert existing assets to cash or new assets with liquidity that central banks would guarantee.

Will Asset Managers Dash for Cash? Implications for Central Banks

We consider ways central banks could adapt in the event of an increased risk of a dash for cash from asset managers. We explore ideas such as new facilities that ease asset managers’ ability to convert existing assets to cash or new assets with liquidity that central banks would guarantee.

Stress testing central counterparties for resolution planning

The Bank of Canada completed its first resolution plan for the Canadian Derivatives and Clearing Corporation (CDCC) in 2024. To estimate the resolution costs, we apply the extreme value theory method to simulate the credit losses that would result from extreme scenarios where multiple clearing members default at the same time.

The Prudential Toolkit with Shadow Banking

Staff Working Paper 2025-9 Kinda Hachem, Martin Kuncl
Can regulators keep pace with banks’ creative regulatory workarounds? Our analysis unpacks the trade-offs between fixed regulations and crisis-triggered rules, showing that the latter are especially prone to circumvention—and can trigger larger, costlier bailouts.

Crisis facilities as a source of public information

Staff Analytical Note 2025-7 Lerby Ergun
During the COVID-19 financial market crisis, central banks introduced programs to support liquidity in important core funding markets. As well as acting as a backstop to market prices, these programs produce useful trading data on prevailing market conditions. When summary information from this data is shared publicly, it can help market participants understand current conditions and aid the recovery of market functioning.

The new repo tri-party Canadian Collateral Management Service: Benefits to the financial system and to the Bank of Canada

Staff Analytical Note 2025-6 Philippe Muller, Maksym Padalko
The Canadian Collateral Management Service (CCMS) is a new tri-party collateral management service offered by the TMX Group and Clearstream. CCMS will enhance Canada’s financial infrastructure for securities financing transactions, including for the repurchase, or repo, market that is a core funding market in Canada. We explain the importance of the repo market and describe the benefits of the CCMS for market participants and for the Bank of Canada.

Effects of macroprudential policy announcements on perceptions of systemic risks

We introduce a history of macroprudential policy (MPP) events in Canada since the 1980s. We document the short-run effects of MPP announcements on market-based measures of systemic risk and find that MPPs can influence the market’s perception of large banks’ resilience.
January 16, 2025

Back to normal for the balance sheet

Speech summary Toni Gravelle VersaFi (formerly Women in Capital Markets) Toronto, Ontario
Deputy Governor Toni Gravelle provides an update on when quantitative tightening will end and explains how the Bank of Canada will manage its balance sheet going forward.
January 16, 2025

The end of quantitative tightening and what comes next

Remarks Toni Gravelle VersaFi (formerly Women in Capital Markets) Toronto, Ontario
Deputy Governor Toni Gravelle provides an update on when quantitative tightening will end and how the Bank of Canada will manage its balance sheet after that.

Non-Bank Dealing and Liquidity Bifurcation in Fixed-Income Markets

Staff Working Paper 2025-2 Michael Brolley, David Cimon
We model non-bank entry into fixed-income markets and state-dependent liquidity. Non-bank financial institutions improve liquidity more during normal times than in stress. Banks may become less reliable to marginal clients, exacerbating the difference in liquidity between normal and stressed times. Central bank lending during stress may limit this harmful division.
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