March 17, 2025 Will asset managers dash for cash? A summary of the implications for central banks David Cimon, Jean-Philippe Dion, Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Jabir Sandhu We consider ways central banks could adapt in the event of an increased risk of a dash for cash from asset managers. We explore ideas such as new facilities that ease asset managers’ ability to convert existing assets to cash or new assets with liquidity that central banks would guarantee. Content Type(s): Publications, Financial System Hub articles Research Topic(s): Central bank research, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19), Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, G, G0, G00, G01, G1, G2
Will Asset Managers Dash for Cash? Implications for Central Banks Staff Discussion Paper 2025-5 David Cimon, Jean-Philippe Dion, Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Jabir Sandhu We consider ways central banks could adapt in the event of an increased risk of a dash for cash from asset managers. We explore ideas such as new facilities that ease asset managers’ ability to convert existing assets to cash or new assets with liquidity that central banks would guarantee. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Research Topic(s): Central bank research, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19), Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, G, G0, G00, G01, G1, G2
Stress testing central counterparties for resolution planning Staff Analytical Note 2025-11 Katherine Brennan, Bo Young Chang, Alper Odabasioglu, Radoslav Raykov The Bank of Canada completed its first resolution plan for the Canadian Derivatives and Clearing Corporation (CDCC) in 2024. To estimate the resolution costs, we apply the extreme value theory method to simulate the credit losses that would result from extreme scenarios where multiple clearing members default at the same time. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G1, G17, G2, G23, G28
The Prudential Toolkit with Shadow Banking Staff Working Paper 2025-9 Kinda Hachem, Martin Kuncl Can regulators keep pace with banks’ creative regulatory workarounds? Our analysis unpacks the trade-offs between fixed regulations and crisis-triggered rules, showing that the latter are especially prone to circumvention—and can trigger larger, costlier bailouts. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): D, D6, D62, E, E6, E61, G, G0, G01, G2, G21, G28
Crisis facilities as a source of public information Staff Analytical Note 2025-7 Lerby Ergun During the COVID-19 financial market crisis, central banks introduced programs to support liquidity in important core funding markets. As well as acting as a backstop to market prices, these programs produce useful trading data on prevailing market conditions. When summary information from this data is shared publicly, it can help market participants understand current conditions and aid the recovery of market functioning. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): C, C5, C58, D, D5, D53, D8, D83, G, G1, G12, G14
The new repo tri-party Canadian Collateral Management Service: Benefits to the financial system and to the Bank of Canada Staff Analytical Note 2025-6 Philippe Muller, Maksym Padalko The Canadian Collateral Management Service (CCMS) is a new tri-party collateral management service offered by the TMX Group and Clearstream. CCMS will enhance Canada’s financial infrastructure for securities financing transactions, including for the repurchase, or repo, market that is a core funding market in Canada. We explain the importance of the repo market and describe the benefits of the CCMS for market participants and for the Bank of Canada. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): G, G1, G2, G23
Effects of macroprudential policy announcements on perceptions of systemic risks Staff Analytical Note 2025-4 Thibaut Duprey, Victoria Fernandes, Kerem Tuzcuoglu, Ruhani Walia We introduce a history of macroprudential policy (MPP) events in Canada since the 1980s. We document the short-run effects of MPP announcements on market-based measures of systemic risk and find that MPPs can influence the market’s perception of large banks’ resilience. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Research Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, G, G2, G21, G28, G3, G32
January 16, 2025 Back to normal for the balance sheet Speech summary Toni Gravelle VersaFi (formerly Women in Capital Markets) Toronto, Ontario Deputy Governor Toni Gravelle provides an update on when quantitative tightening will end and explains how the Bank of Canada will manage its balance sheet going forward. Content Type(s): Press, Speeches and appearances, Speech summaries Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing, Monetary policy implementation, Monetary policy transmission, Recent economic and financial developments
January 16, 2025 The end of quantitative tightening and what comes next Remarks Toni Gravelle VersaFi (formerly Women in Capital Markets) Toronto, Ontario Deputy Governor Toni Gravelle provides an update on when quantitative tightening will end and how the Bank of Canada will manage its balance sheet after that. Content Type(s): Press, Speeches and appearances, Remarks Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing, Monetary policy implementation, Monetary policy transmission, Recent economic and financial developments
Non-Bank Dealing and Liquidity Bifurcation in Fixed-Income Markets Staff Working Paper 2025-2 Michael Brolley, David Cimon We model non-bank entry into fixed-income markets and state-dependent liquidity. Non-bank financial institutions improve liquidity more during normal times than in stress. Banks may become less reliable to marginal clients, exacerbating the difference in liquidity between normal and stressed times. Central bank lending during stress may limit this harmful division. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Economic models, Financial institutions, Financial markets, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): G, G1, G10, G2, G20, G21, G23, L, L1, L10, L13, L14