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27 Results

Ecosystem Models for a Central Bank Digital Currency: Analysis Framework and Potential Models

This note analyzes different economic models of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) ecosystem where the central bank chooses different levels of market involvement and usage of policy levers. The analysis suggests that there are trade-offs between the costs to the central bank and its ability to achieve policy goals like universal access.

Central Bank Liquidity Policy in Modern Times

Staff Discussion Paper 2024-6 Skylar Brooks
Across several dimensions of lender of last resort policy, I highlight broad changes that have occurred since the 2008–09 global financial crisis and discuss some of the key challenges, choices and considerations facing the designers of central bank liquidity tools today.

(Un)Conventional Monetary and Fiscal Policy

Staff Working Paper 2023-6 Jing Cynthia Wu, Yinxi Xie
We build a tractable New Keynesian model to study and compare four types of monetary and fiscal policy: policy rate adjustments, quantitative easing, lump-sum fiscal transfers and government spending. We find that tax-financed fiscal policy is more stimulative than debt-financed policy, and optimal policy coordination needs at least two of these four policy instruments.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Fiscal policy, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E4, E6, E61, E62, E63

COVID-19 and Financial Stability: Practice Ahead of Theory

Staff Discussion Paper 2022-18 Jing Yang, Hélène Desgagnés, Grzegorz Halaj, Yaz Terajima
The COVID-19 pandemic uncovered policy challenges related to the economic measures that were taken to support the economy. Two years later, we attempt to identify the broader impact of these measures and research that needs to follow.

The Central Bank Strikes Back! Credibility of Monetary Policy under Fiscal Influence

Staff Working Paper 2022-11 Antoine Camous, Dmitry Matveev
Central banks in many advanced economies enjoy a high degree of independence, which protects monetary policy decisions from political influence. But how should independent central banks react if pressured by fiscal policy-makers? We examine whether a central bank should design a monetary policy framework that prescribes acting conditionally on how fiscal policy behaves.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credibility, Fiscal policy, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E0, E02, E5, E52, E58, E6, E61, E62

The Power of Helicopter Money Revisited: A New Keynesian Perspective

Staff Discussion Paper 2020-1 Thomas J. Carter, Rhys R. Mendes
We analyze money financing of fiscal transfers (helicopter money) in two simple New Keynesian models: a “textbook” model in which all money is non-interest-bearing (e.g., all money is currency), and a more realistic model with interest-bearing reserves.

Credibility, Flexibility and Renewal: The Evolution of Inflation Targeting in Canada

Staff Discussion Paper 2018-18 Thomas J. Carter, Rhys R. Mendes, Lawrence L. Schembri
In 1991, Canada became the second country to adopt an inflation target as a central pillar of its monetary policy framework. The regime has proven much more successful than initially expected, both in achieving price stability and in stabilizing the real economy against a wide range of shocks.

Assessing the Impact of Demand Shocks on the US Term Premium

Staff Discussion Paper 2018-7 Russell Barnett, Konrad Zmitrowicz
During and after the Great Recession of 2008–09, conventional monetary policy in the United States and many other advanced economies was constrained by the effective lower bound (ELB) on nominal interest rates. Several central banks implemented large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs, more commonly known as quantitative easing or QE, to provide additional monetary stimulus.

Communicating Uncertainty in Monetary Policy

Staff Discussion Paper 2017-14 Sharon Kozicki, Jill Vardy
While central banks cannot provide complete foresight with respect to their future policy actions, it is in the interests of both central banks and market participants that central banks be transparent about their reaction functions and how they may evolve in response to economic developments, shocks, and risks to their outlooks.

Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty: Practice Versus Theory

Staff Discussion Paper 2017-13 Rhys R. Mendes, Stephen Murchison, Carolyn A. Wilkins
For central banks, conducting policy in an environment of uncertainty is a daily fact of life. This uncertainty can take many forms, ranging from incomplete knowledge of the correct economic model and data to future economic and geopolitical events whose precise magnitudes and effects cannot be known with certainty.
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