The (Mis)Allocation of Corporate News Staff Working Paper 2024-47 Xing Guo, Alistair Macaulay, Wenting Song We study how the distribution of information supply by the news media affects the macroeconomy. We find that media coverage focuses particularly on the largest firms, and that firms’ equity financing and investment increase after media coverage. But these equity and investment responses are largest among small, rarely covered firms. Our quantitative studies highlight that the aggregate effects of media coverage depend crucially on how that coverage is allocated. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Firm dynamics JEL Code(s): D, D2, D22, D6, D61, L, L1, L11, L2, L20
Inequality in Parental Transfers, Borrowing Constraints and Optimal Higher Education Subsidies Staff Working Paper 2019-7 Youngmin Park This paper studies optimal education subsidies when parental transfers are unequally distributed across students and cannot be publicly observed. After documenting substantial inequality in parental transfers among US college students with similar family resources, I examine its implications for how the education subsidy should vary with schooling level and family resources to minimize inefficiencies generated by borrowing constraints. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Fiscal policy, Potential output, Productivity JEL Code(s): D, D1, D14, D6, D61, D64, D8, D82, I, I2, I22, J, J2, J24
Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences Staff Working Paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61