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781 Results

Anatomy of a Twin Crisis

Staff Working Paper 2003-41 Raphael Solomon
The author presents a model of a twin crisis, in which foreign and domestic residents play a banking game. Both "honest" and run equilibria of the post-deposit subgame exist; some run equilibria lead to a currency crisis, as agents convert domestic currency to foreign currency.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Exchange rates, Financial institutions JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, F, F3, F30, G, G2, G21

Financial Constraints and Investment: Assessing the Impact of a World Bank Loan Program on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Sri Lanka

Staff Working Paper 2003-37 Varouj Aivazian, Dipak Mazumdar, Eric Santor
The authors examine the investment behaviour of a sample of small, credit-constrained firms in Sri Lanka. Using a unique panel-data set, they analyze and compare the activities of two groups of small firms distinguished by their different access to financing; one group consists of firms with heavily subsidized loans from the World Bank, and the other consists of firms without such subsidies.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Development economics JEL Code(s): G, G0, G00, O, O1, O16

Excess Collateral in the LVTS: How Much is Too Much?

Staff Working Paper 2003-36 Kim McPhail, Anastasia Vakos
The authors build a theoretical model that generates demand for collateral by Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) participants under the assumption that they minimize the cost of holding and managing collateral for LVTS purposes. The model predicts that the optimal amount of collateral held by each LVTS participant depends on the opportunity cost of collateral, the transactions costs of acquiring assets used as collateral and transferring them in and out of the LVTS, and the distribution of an LVTS participant's payment flows in the LVTS.

Governance and Financial Fragility: Evidence from a Cross-Section of Countries

Staff Working Paper 2003-34 Michael Francis
The author explores the role of governance mechanisms as a means of reducing financial fragility. First, he develops a simple theoretical general-equilibrium model in which instability arises due to an agency problem resulting from a conflict of interest between the borrower and lender.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Financial markets JEL Code(s): G, G0
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