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112 Results

Are Long-Horizon Expectations (De-)Stabilizing? Theory and Experiments

Staff Working Paper 2019-27 George Evans, Cars Hommes, Isabelle Salle, Bruce McGough
Most models in finance assume that agents make trading plans over the infinite future. We consider instead that they are boundedly rational and may only form forecasts over a limited horizon.

Central Bank Communication That Works: Lessons from Lab Experiments

Staff Working Paper 2019-21 Oleksiy Kryvtsov, Luba Petersen
We use controlled laboratory experiments to test the causal effects of central bank communication on economic expectations and to distinguish the underlying mechanisms of those effects. In an experiment where subjects learn to forecast economic variables, we find that central bank communication has a stabilizing effect on individual and aggregate outcomes and that the size of the effect varies with the type of communication.

Inequality in Parental Transfers, Borrowing Constraints and Optimal Higher Education Subsidies

Staff Working Paper 2019-7 Youngmin Park
This paper studies optimal education subsidies when parental transfers are unequally distributed across students and cannot be publicly observed. After documenting substantial inequality in parental transfers among US college students with similar family resources, I examine its implications for how the education subsidy should vary with schooling level and family resources to minimize inefficiencies generated by borrowing constraints.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Fiscal policy, Potential output, Productivity JEL Code(s): D, D1, D14, D6, D61, D64, D8, D82, I, I2, I22, J, J2, J24

Readability and the Bank of Canada

Staff Analytical Note 2018-20 Alexandre Deslongchamps
In this note, I assess the readability of Bank of Canada publications using a formula commonly used for this type of evaluation. I find that Bank publications are more difficult to read than the media articles and other content our target audiences likely consume. This suggests that more simple writing can help the Bank better meet its communication objectives.

Adverse Selection with Heterogeneously Informed Agents

Staff Working Paper 2018-7 Mohammad Davoodalhosseini
A model of over-the-counter markets is proposed. Some asset buyers are informed in that they can identify high quality assets. Heterogeneous sellers with private information choose what type of buyers they want to trade with.
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