On the Existence and Fragility of Repo Markets Staff Working Paper 2012-17 Hajime Tomura This paper presents a model of an over-the-counter bond market in which bond dealers and cash investors arrange repurchase agreements (repos) endogenously. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G2, G24
The U.S.-Dollar Supranational Zero-Coupon Curve Staff Discussion Paper 2012-5 Francisco Rivadeneyra The author describes the construction of the U.S.-dollar-denominated zero-coupon curve for the supranational asset class from 1995 to 2010. He uses yield data from a crosssection of bonds issued by AAA-rated supranational entities to fit the Svensson (1995) term-structure model. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Asset pricing, Financial markets JEL Code(s): G, G1, G12, G15
Estimating the Demand for Settlement Balances in the Canadian Large Value Transfer System Staff Working Paper 2012-15 Nellie Zhang This paper applies a static model of an interest rate corridor to the Canadian data, and estimates the aggregate demand for central-bank settlement balances in the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS). Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Interest rates, Monetary policy implementation, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C3, C36, E, E4, E40, E5, E50, G, G0, G01
May 17, 2012 Understanding Systemic Risk in the Banking Sector: A MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework Bank of Canada Review - Spring 2012 Céline Gauthier, Moez Souissi The MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework (MFRAF) models the interconnections between liquidity and solvency in a financial system, with multiple institutions linked through an interbank network. The MFRAF integrates funding liquidity risk as an endogenous outcome of the interactions between solvency risk and the liquidity profiles of banks, which is a complementary approach to the new […] Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, G, G0, G01, G2, G21
May 17, 2012 Conference Summary: New Developments in Payments and Settlement Bank of Canada Review - Spring 2012 Ben Fung, Miguel Molico The Bank of Canada’s annual conference, held in November 2011, brought together leading researchers from universities, central banks and other institutions from around the world. Divided into four sessions plus two keynote addresses, the conference covered such topics as the use of cash and other means of payment in retail transactions, large-value payments systems, and […] Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Bank notes, Central bank research, Financial system regulation and policies, Monetary policy implementation, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E42, G, G2, G28, L, L8, L81
Risk Premium, Variance Premium and the Maturity Structure of Uncertainty Staff Working Paper 2012-11 Bruno Feunou, Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Abderrahim Taamouti, Roméo Tedongap Expected returns vary when investors face time-varying investment opportunities. Long-run risk models (Bansal and Yaron 2004) and no-arbitrage affine models (Duffie, Pan, and Singleton 2000) emphasize sources of risk that are not observable to the econometrician. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Asset pricing, Financial services JEL Code(s): G, G1, G12, G13
A Note on Central Counterparties in Repo Markets Staff Discussion Paper 2012-4 Hajime Tomura The author introduces a central counterparty (CCP) into a model of a repo market. Without the CCP, there exist multiple equilibria in the model. In one of the equilibria, a repo market emerges as bond dealers and cash investors choose to arrange repos in an over-the-counter bond market. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G2, G24
When Is It Less Costly for Risky Firms to Borrow? Evidence from the Bank Risk- Taking Channel of Monetary Policy Staff Working Paper 2012-10 Teodora Paligorova, João Santos In an investigation of banks’ loan pricing policies in the United States over the past two decades, this study finds supporting evidence for the bank risk-taking channel of monetary policy. We show that banks charge lower spreads when they lend to riskier borrowers relative to the spreads they charge on loans to safer borrowers in periods of low short-term rates compared to periods of high short-term rates. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Monetary policy framework JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21
Central Bank Communication or the Media’s Interpretation: What Moves Markets? Staff Working Paper 2012-9 Scott Hendry The goal of this paper is to investigate what type of information from Bank of Canada communication statements or the market commentary based on these statements has a significant effect on the volatility or level of returns in a short-term interest rate market. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Asset pricing, Financial markets JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, G, G1, G14
February 23, 2012 Household Insolvency in Canada Bank of Canada Review - Winter 2011-2012 Jason Allen, H. Evren Damar With increasing levels of household debt in recent years, the number of households that may be vulnerable to a negative economic shock is rising as well. Decisions made by both the debtor and the creditor can contribute to insolvency. This article presents some stylized facts about insolvency in Canada’s household sector and analyzes the role of creditors in insolvencies. The average debt of an individual filing for bankruptcy is more than 1.5 times that of an average Canadian household; bankruptcy filers tend to be unemployed or in low-wage jobs, and are typically renters. The article reports that banks that approve more loans per branch, which is interpreted as less-intensive use of soft information (such as the loan officer’s assessment of the applicant’s character), experience more client bankruptcies. This finding has important policy implications, because financial institutions that do not use soft information risk further deterioration in their lending portfolios. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services JEL Code(s): D, D4, G, G2