Are Bygones not Bygones? Modeling Price Level Targeting with an Escape Clause and Lessons from the Gold Standard Staff Working Paper 2008-27 Paul Masson, Malik Shukayev Like the gold standard, price level targeting (PT) involves not letting past deviations of inflation be bygones; both regimes return the price level (or price of gold) to its target. The experience of suspension of the gold standard in World War I, resumption in the 1920s (for some countries at a different parity), and final abandonment is reviewed. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credibility, Monetary policy framework JEL Code(s): E, E3, E31, E5, E52
Adopting Price-Level Targeting under Imperfect Credibility Staff Working Paper 2008-3 Oleksiy Kryvtsov, Malik Shukayev, Alexander Ueberfeldt This paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation-targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Vestin (2006) shows that when the monetary authority cannot commit to future policy, price-level targeting yields higher welfare than inflation targeting. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credibility, Monetary policy framework JEL Code(s): E, E3, E31, E5, E52
June 21, 2006 Credibility with Flexibility: The Evolution of Inflation-Targeting Regimes, 1990–2006 Bank of Canada Review - Summer 2006 Graydon Paulin Beginning with a review of the adoption of inflation targeting in a broad group of countries, Paulin focuses on changes in the design of inflation-targeting frameworks in light of fifteen years of accumulated experience. Included in the discussion are the use of numerical targets and ranges, the policy horizon, supporting institutional policy structures, and communication, including the publication of forecasts. A recurring theme is how much flexibility an inflation-targeting regime allows. The article concludes that the changes made to the frameworks have been relatively modest since their adoption, but in concert with the improved credibility that has resulted from central banks meeting their inflation-control targets, they have allowed an increasingly nuanced response to economic shocks. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Credibility, Inflation targets, Monetary policy framework
The 1975–78 Anti-Inflation Program in Retrospect Staff Working Paper 2005-43 John Sargent The author provides an overview of the 1975–78 Anti-Inflation Program (AIP), in a background document prepared for a seminar organized by the Bank of Canada to mark the AIP's 30th anniversary. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credibility, Fiscal policy, Inflation and prices, Inflation targets, Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy implementation JEL Code(s): E, E3, E31, E5, E52, E6, E63, E64, E65
June 22, 2005 Estimating the Impact of Monetary Policy Surprises on Fixed-Income Markets Bank of Canada Review - Summer 2005 Jason Andreou In the interest of better understanding the impact of the Bank of Canada's policy actions on bond and bill yields, Andreou assesses the impact of policy-rate announcements on short and long bonds over the period 1996 to 2004. To aid the analysis, policy actions are decomposed into expected and surprise components. He also examines whether the introduction of fixed announcement dates (FADs) has affected these results, including markets' perceptions. The main finding is that unexpected policy actions by the Bank have a significant effect on market rates at the shorter end of the yield curve, with the effect dissipating as the maturity increases. A second finding, that the impact on longer-term interest rates of a surprise action by the Bank has diminished since the introduction of the FADs, suggests that the Bank's long-term policy goals are well understood and credible. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Credibility, Financial markets, Monetary policy and uncertainty
November 23, 2003 An Evaluation of Fixed Announcement Dates Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2003 Nicolas Parent, Phoebe Munro, Ron Parker When it launched a new system for regularly announcing its decisions regarding the overnight rate of interest in December 2000, the Bank of Canada had a number of key objectives in mind. These included reduced uncertainty in financial markets, greater focus on the Canadian rather than the U.S. economic environment, more emphasis on the medium-term perspective of monetary policy, and increased transparency regarding the Bank's interest rate decisions. Evidence to date suggests that all four objectives have been met to a substantial degree. Fixed announcement dates have provided regular opportunities for the Bank to communicate its views on the state of the Canadian economy to the public. This has helped to improve understanding of the broad direction of monetary policy and of the rationale behind the Bank's policy decisions although the decisions themselves are not always fully anticipated. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Credibility, Financial markets, Interest rates, Monetary policy and uncertainty, Monetary policy implementation
May 21, 2002 Inflation and the Macroeconomy: Changes from the 1980s to the 1990s Bank of Canada Review - Spring 2002 David Longworth Over the last 10 years, the level of inflation has been much lower than in the previous two decades. At the same time, the behaviour of inflation has changed profoundly. By surveying the data and the economic research, the author first examines changes in the variability, growth rates, and behaviour of some of the major macroeconomic variables during the 1980s and 1990s. He then looks at how these changes are linked to a shift in the approach of monetary policy over the period. Lastly, he reviews the economic benefits that these changes have had for Canada. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Credibility, Inflation targets, Inflation: costs and benefits
Gaining Credibility for Inflation Targets Staff Working Paper 2001-11 James Yetman In this paper, I consider a simple model in which agents learn about the inflation target of a central bank over time by observing the policy instrument or inflation outcomes. Measuring credibility as the distance between the perceived target and the actual target, an increase in credibility is beneficial to the central bank because it brings the policy consistent with attaining the inflation target closer to that required to attain the output target. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credibility, Inflation targets JEL Code(s): E, E5, E52
The Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates: How Important Is It? Staff Working Paper 2001-6 David Amirault, Brian O'Reilly This paper surveys the literature on the zero bound on the nominal interest rate. It addresses questions ranging from the conditions under which the zero bound on the nominal interest rate might occur to policy options to avoid or use to exit from such a situation. We discuss literature that examines historical and country evidence, and literature that uses models to generate evidence on this question. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credibility, Inflation targets, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): E, E3, E31, E5, E52, E58, E6, E61
August 16, 2000 The Changing Face of Central Banking in the 1990s Bank of Canada Review - Summer 2000 Graydon Paulin During the 1990s, central banks in the industrialized countries made important changes in the way they operate. As part of these initiatives, central banks have endeavoured to define a set of best practices, learning from each other in the process. The goal was to improve and adapt the frameworks within which monetary policy is implemented. Clarifying Objectives A clear objective is a necessary starting point for any policy framework. The growing consensus that price stability is the most appropriate objective for monetary policy was perhaps one of the most critical developments of the past decade. Price stability is now universally regarded as the key contribution that monetary policy can make to promote sustainable growth and maximize the level of employment. Central banks also need a clear strategy for achieving their objective. A major development of the past decade was the growing popularity of inflation targets as the numerical focus for monetary policy. Clearly defined inflation targets focus policy on the variable that is directly associated with price stability. The Bank of Canada was one of the first to adopt (in 1991) a set of targets for inflation over a specified time horizon. Accountability Many central banks have acquired greater independence and this, together with the public's desire for more information from key public institutions, has raised the standards for accountability. At the same time, explicit targets provide a clear measure against which to judge the performance of the monetary authorities. Increased accountability also has implications for the overall transparency of the monetary authorities. In sum, central banks have become much more open institutions and are placing greater emphasis on their communications activities. As an example, comprehensive inflation reports have become key communications vehicles for a number of central banks. Many of the changes implemented by central banks stem from the desire to improve the credibility of monetary policy, thus making it easier for monetary authorities to achieve their objectives. Although it is difficult to ascertain the overall effect of the evolving policy framework, it is encouraging that inflation and inflation expectations were at low levels at the end of the 1990s, thus providing a solid base for monetary policy in the future. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Credibility, Inflation targets, International topics, Monetary policy framework