Search

Content Types

Topics

JEL Codes

Locations

Departments

Authors

Sources

Statuses

Published After

Published Before

109 Results

Revisiting the Monetary Sovereignty Rationale for CBDCs

Staff Discussion Paper 2021-17 Skylar Brooks
One argument for central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) is that without them, private and foreign digital monies could displace domestic currencies, threatening the central bank’s monetary policy and lender of last resort capabilities. I revisit this monetary sovereignty rationale and offer a wider view—one that considers a broader set of currency functions and captures important cross-country variation.

Payment Habits During COVID-19: Evidence from High-Frequency Transaction Data

Staff Working Paper 2021-43 Tatjana Dahlhaus, Angelika Welte
We examine how consumers have adjusted their payment habits during the COVID-19 pandemic. They seem to perform fewer transactions, spend more in each transaction, use less cash at the point of sale and withdraw cash from ATMs linked to their financial institution more often than from other ATMs.

The Positive Case for a CBDC

Staff Discussion Paper 2021-11 Andrew Usher, Edona Reshidi, Francisco Rivadeneyra, Scott Hendry
We discuss the competition and innovation arguments for issuing a central bank digital currency (CBDC). A CBDC could be an effective competition policy tool for payments. A CBDC could also support the vibrancy of the digital economy. It could help solve market failures and foster competition and innovation in new digital payments markets.

An Exploration of First Nations Reserves and Access to Cash

Staff Discussion Paper 2021-8 Heng Chen, Walter Engert, Kim Huynh, Daneal O’Habib
Adequate cash distribution is one the Bank of Canada’s core interests. Canadians’ ability to access cash influences the Bank’s thinking on issuing a central bank digital currency. We provide a perspective on these issues by exploring access of First Nations reserves to cash.

Behaviour in the Canadian large-value payment system: COVID-19 vs. the global financial crisis

Staff Analytical Note 2021-7 Alexander Chaudhry, Anneke Kosse, Karen Sondergard
Unlike the 2008–09 global financial crisis, the onset of the COVID-19 crisis did not raise stress levels in Canada’s Large Value Transfer System. Swift changes to the Bank of Canada’s collateral policy and its large-scale asset purchase programs likely eased liquidity pressures in the system.

Distributional Effects of Payment Card Pricing and Merchant Cost Pass-through in Canada and the United States

Although credit cards are more expensive for merchants to accept than cash or debit cards, merchants typically pass through their costs evenly to all customers. Along with consumer card rewards and banking fees, this creates cross-subsidies between payment methods. Because higher-income individuals tend to use credit cards more than those with lower incomes, our results indicate that these cross-subsidies might lead to regressive distributional effects.

Estimating Policy Functions in Payments Systems Using Reinforcement Learning

We demonstrate the ability of reinforcement learning techniques to estimate the best-response functions of banks participating in high-value payments systems—a real-world strategic game of incomplete information.

Eggs in One Basket: Security and Convenience of Digital Currencies

Staff Working Paper 2021-6 Charles M. Kahn, Francisco Rivadeneyra, Tsz-Nga Wong
Digital currencies store balances in anonymous electronic addresses. This paper analyzes the trade-offs between the safety and convenience of aggregating balances in addresses, electronic wallets and banks.

Using Payments Data to Nowcast Macroeconomic Variables During the Onset of COVID-19

Staff Working Paper 2021-2 James Chapman, Ajit Desai
We use retail payment data in conjunction with machine learning techniques to predict the effects of COVID-19 on the Canadian economy in near-real time. Our model yields a significant increase in macroeconomic prediction accuracy over a linear benchmark model.

Safe Payments

In a cashless economy, would the private sector invest in the optimal level of safety in a deposit-based payment system? In general, because of externalities, the answer is no. While the private sector could over- or under-invest in safety, the government can use taxes or subsidies to correct private incentives.
Go To Page