Banking Regulation and Market Making Staff Working Paper 2017-7 David Cimon, Corey Garriott We model how securities dealers respond to regulations on leverage, position and liquidity such as those imposed by the Basel III framework. We show that while asset prices exhibit greater price impact, bid-ask spreads do not change and trading volumes may even increase. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): G, G1, G14, G2, G20, L, L1, L10
Optimal Capital Regulation Staff Working Paper 2017-6 Stéphane Moyen, Josef Schroth We study constrained-efficient bank capital regulation in a model with market-imposed equity requirements. Banks hold equity buffers to insure against sudden loss of access to funding. However, in the model, banks choose to only partially self-insure because equity is privately costly. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credit and credit aggregates, Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E1, E13, E3, E32, E4, E44
Canadian Bank Notes and Dominion Notes: Lessons for Digital Currencies Staff Working Paper 2017-5 Ben Fung, Scott Hendry, Warren E. Weber This paper studies the period in Canada when both private bank notes and government-issued notes (Dominion notes) were simultaneously in circulation. Because both of these notes shared many of the characteristics of today's digital currencies, the experience with these notes can be used to draw lessons about how digital currencies might perform. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Bank notes, Digital currencies and fintech, Financial services JEL Code(s): E, E4, E41, E42, E5, E58
Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences Staff Working Paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61
February 10, 2017 Weekly Financial Statistics - 10 February 2017 Content Type(s): Publications, Historical: Weekly Financial Statistics
February 9, 2017 Getting to the Core of Inflation Remarks Lawrence L. Schembri Department of Economics, Western University London, Ontario Deputy Governor Lawrence Schembri discusses the uses and measures of core inflation in the conduct of monetary policy. Content Type(s): Press, Speeches and appearances, Remarks Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Central bank research, Inflation and prices, Inflation targets, Monetary policy, Recent economic and financial developments
February 6, 2017 Bank of Canada announces winners of the second edition of The Governor’s Challenge Media Relations Ottawa, Ontario The Bank of Canada today announced that the team from McGill University won the second annual Governor’s Challenge, a student competition in which teams simulate the role of advisor to the Bank’s policy-makers. Content Type(s): Press, Press releases Source(s): The Governor's Challenge