A Model of Tiered Settlement Networks Staff Working Paper 2008-12 James Chapman, Jonathan Chiu, Miguel Molico This paper develops a model of settlement system to study the endogenous structure of settlement networks, and the welfare consequences of clearing agent failure. The equilibrium degree of tiering is endogenously determined by the cost structure and the information structure. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E42, E5, E58, G, G2, G21
Rediscounting Under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard Staff Working Paper 2007-51 James Chapman, Antoine Martin Freeman (1999) proposes a model in which discount window lending and open market operations have different effects. This is important because in most of the literature, these policies are indistinguishable. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Central bank research, Financial markets, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, G, G2, G20
Hedge Funds and Financial Stability: The State of the Debate Staff Discussion Paper 2007-9 Michael R. King, Philipp Maier The authors review the state of the debate on hedge funds and the potential threat that hedge funds pose to financial stability. The collapse of a hedge fund or a group of hedge funds might pose a systemic risk directly by damaging systematically important financial institutions, or indirectly by increasing market volatility and generating a […] Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G1, G15, G18, G2
A Note on Contestability in the Canadian Banking Industry Staff Discussion Paper 2007-7 Jason Allen, Ying Liu The authors examine the degree of contestability in the Canadian banking system using the H-statistic proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) and modified by Bikker, Spierdijk, and Finnie (2006). A modification is necessary because the standard approach of controlling for size using total assets leads to an upward bias in the H-statistic. The authors propose […] Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, L, L1, L11
Unanticipated Defaults and Losses in Canada's Large-Value Payments System, Revisited Staff Discussion Paper 2007-5 Devin Ball, Walter Engert Recent work at the Bank of Canada studied the impact of default in Canada’s large-value payments system, and concluded that participants could readily manage their potential losses (McVanel 2005). In an extension of that work, the authors use a much larger set of daily payments data – with three times as many observations – to […] Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, E47, G, G2, G21
Vulnerabilities in Defined-Benefit Pension Plans Staff Discussion Paper 2007-3 Jack Selody An effective pension system enhances economic and financial efficiency. A majority of pension plans in Canada are defined-benefit (DB) plans, but DB plans are under stress from increasing longevity, low long-term interest rates, and the shrinking equity premium. DB plans are vulnerable to such shocks because they are complex financial vehicles, with interdependencies not fully […] Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions JEL Code(s): G, G2, G23
Modelling Payments Systems: A Review of the Literature Staff Working Paper 2007-28 Jonathan Chiu, Alexandra Lai Payments systems play a fundamental role in an economy by providing the mechanisms through which payments arising from transactions can be settled. The existing literature on the economics of payments systems is large but loosely organized, in that each model uses a distinct set-up and sometimes a distinct equilibrium concept. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E42, E5, E58, G, G2, G21
Best Instruments for Market Discipline in Banking Staff Working Paper 2007-9 Greg Caldwell The author develops a dynamic model of banking competition to determine which capital instrument is most effective in disciplining banks' risk choice. Comparisons are conducted between equity, subordinated debentures (SD), and uninsured deposits (UD) as funding sources. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G28
Stress Testing the Corporate Loans Portfolio of the Canadian Banking Sector Staff Working Paper 2006-47 Miroslav Misina, David Tessier, Shubhasis Dey Stress testing, at its most general level, is an investigation of the performance of an entity under abnormal operating conditions. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability JEL Code(s): C, C1, C15, G, G2, G21, G3, G33
Credit in a Tiered Payments System Staff Working Paper 2006-36 Alexandra Lai, Nikil Chande, Sean O'Connor Payments systems are typically characterized by some degree of tiering, with upstream firms (clearing agents) providing settlement accounts to downstream institutions that wish to clear and settle payments indirectly in these systems (indirect clearers). Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services, Market structure and pricing, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, L, L1, L12, L13, L2, L22