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739 Results

Bank Screening Heterogeneity

Staff Working Paper 2016-56 Thibaut Duprey
Production efficiency and financial stability do not necessarily go hand in hand. With heterogeneity in banks’ abilities to screen borrowers, the market for loans becomes segmented and a self-competition mechanism arises. When heterogeneity increases, the intensive and extensive margins have opposite effects.

Supervising Financial Regulators

Staff Working Paper 2016-52 Josef Schroth
How much discretion should local financial regulators in a banking union have in accommodating local credit demand? I analyze this question in an economy where local regulators privately observe expected output from high lending. They do not fully internalize default costs from high lending since deposit insurance cannot be priced fairly.
November 17, 2016

Recent Changes to the Bank of Canada’s Emergency Lending Assistance Policy

Emergency Lending Assistance (ELA) is a discretionary last-resort collateralized loan or ad-vance by the Bank of Canada to eligible financial institutions (FIs) and financial market infrastructures (FMIs) facing serious liquidity problems. In December 2015, the Bank revised its ELA policy to (i) replace the requirement for an FI’s solvency with the requirement for a credible recovery and resolution framework; (ii) include mortgages as eligible collateral; and (iii) clarify both the eligibility requirements for FMIs and provincially regulated deposit-taking FIs.
November 17, 2016

Market Operations and Liquidity Provision at the Bank of Canada

The Bank of Canada’s framework for market operations and liquidity provision describes how and when central bank liquidity might be offered with regards to the implementation of monetary policy and for supporting the stability of the Canadian financial system. Market participants can therefore plan their transactions knowing that the Bank stands ready to help manage system liquidity to support its objectives for monetary policy and financial stability.
November 17, 2016

Reinventing the Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability

Central banks contribute importantly to the promotion of financial stability given their sys-tem-wide macro-financial perspective and existing roles as lender of last resort and overseer of systemic payment systems. Since the global financial crisis, the financial system role of central banks has expanded to place more emphasis on the prevention of financial stress and crises. Central banks work with other responsible authorities to enhance financial system resilience and to assess and mitigate financial vulnerabilities and systemic risk.

Monetary Policy Tradeoffs Between Financial Stability and Price Stability

Staff Working Paper 2016-49 Malik Shukayev, Alexander Ueberfeldt
We analyze the impact of interest rate policy on financial stability in an environment where banks can experience runs on their short-term liabilities, forcing them to sell assets at fire-sale prices.

Managing Risk Taking with Interest Rate Policy and Macroprudential Regulations

Staff Working Paper 2016-47 Simona Cociuba, Malik Shukayev, Alexander Ueberfeldt
We develop a model in which a financial intermediary’s investment in risky assets—risk taking—is excessive due to limited liability and deposit insurance and characterize the policy tools that implement efficient risk taking.

Fragility of Resale Markets for Securitized Assets and Policy of Asset Purchases

Staff Working Paper 2016-46 Martin Kuncl
Markets for securitized assets were characterized by high liquidity prior to the recent financial crisis and by a sudden market dry-up at the onset of the crisis. A general equilibrium model with heterogeneous investment opportunities and information frictions predicts that, in boom periods or mild recessions, the degree of adverse selection in resale markets for securitized assets is limited because of the reputation-based guarantees by asset originators.

Financial Constraint and Productivity: Evidence from Canadian SMEs

Staff Working Paper 2016-44 Shutao Cao, Danny Leung
The degree to which financial constraint is binding is often not directly observable in commonly used business data sets (e.g., Compustat). In this paper, we measure and estimate the likelihood of a firm being constrained by external financing using a data set of small- and medium-sized Canadian firms.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Firm dynamics, Productivity JEL Code(s): D, D2, D24, G, G3, G32, L, L2, L25
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