Market Concentration and Uniform Pricing: Evidence from Bank Mergers Staff Working Paper 2021-9 João Granja, Nuno Paixao We show that US banks price deposits almost uniformly across their branches and that this pricing practice is more important than increases in local market concentration in explaining the deposit rate dynamics following bank mergers. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, G, G2, G20, G21, G28, G3, G34, L, L1, L11
Maturity Composition and the Demand for Government Debt Staff Working Paper 2020-29 Jason Allen, Jakub Kastl, Milena Wittwer The main objectives of debt management are to raise stable and low-cost funding to meet the government’s financial needs and to maintain a well-functioning market for government securities. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Debt management, Financial markets JEL Code(s): C, C1, C14, D, D4, D44, E, E5, E58, G, G1, G12
Non-competing Data Intermediaries Staff Working Paper 2020-28 Shota Ichihashi I study a model of competing data intermediaries (e.g., online platforms and data brokers) that collect personal data from consumers and sell it to downstream firms. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): D, D4, D42, D43, D8, D80, L, L1, L12
Dynamic Competition in Negotiated Price Markets Staff Working Paper 2020-22 Jason Allen, Shaoteng Li Repeated interactions between borrowers and lenders create the possibility of dynamic pricing: lenders compete aggressively with low prices to attract new borrowers and then raise their prices once borrowers have made a commitment. We find such pricing patterns in the Canadian mortgage market. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, G, G2, G21, L, L2
Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding & Auction Design Staff Working Paper 2019-30 Jason Allen, Robert Clark, Brent Hickman, Eric Richert Bank resolution is costly. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) typically resolves failing banks by auction. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Financial institutions JEL Code(s): C, C5, C57, D, D4, D44, G, G2, G21
The Cost of the Government Bond Buyback and Switch Programs in Canada Staff Analytical Note 2018-41 Bo Young Chang, Jun Yang, Parker Liu This note examines the costs of the Government of Canada bond buyback and switch programs between 1998 and 2016. Our analysis indicates that the auction design of the buyback program was effective in retiring government debt with minimal costs resulting from bid shading in auctions and price impact. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Debt management JEL Code(s): D, D4, D44
Adverse Selection with Heterogeneously Informed Agents Staff Working Paper 2018-7 Mohammad Davoodalhosseini A model of over-the-counter markets is proposed. Some asset buyers are informed in that they can identify high quality assets. Heterogeneous sellers with private information choose what type of buyers they want to trade with. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D40, D8, D82, D83, G, G0, G01, G1, G10, G2, G20
Repo Market Functioning when the Interest Rate Is Low or Negative Staff Discussion Paper 2017-3 Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, James Hately, Adrian Walton This paper investigates how a low or negative overnight interest rate might affect the Canadian repo markets. The main conclusion is that the repo market for general collateral will continue to function effectively. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Interest rates, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, G, G1, G10, G12
Information Sharing and Bargaining in Buyer-Seller Networks Staff Working Paper 2016-63 Sofia Priazhkina, Frank H. Page This paper presents a model of strategic buyer-seller networks with information exchange between sellers. Prior to engaging in bargaining with buyers, sellers can share access to buyers for a negotiated transfer. We study how this information exchange affects overall market prices, volumes and welfare, given different initial market conditions and information sharing rules. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Firm dynamics, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): C, C7, C71, C78, D, D2, D21, D4, D43, D8, D85, L, L1, L13
Identification and Estimation of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions with Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity Staff Working Paper 2016-23 Serafin Grundl, Yu Zhu This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods JEL Code(s): C, C1, C14, C5, C57, D, D4, D44, L, L0, L00