On the Existence and Fragility of Repo Markets Staff Working Paper 2012-17 Hajime Tomura This paper presents a model of an over-the-counter bond market in which bond dealers and cash investors arrange repurchase agreements (repos) endogenously. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G2, G24
May 17, 2012 Understanding Systemic Risk in the Banking Sector: A MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework Bank of Canada Review - Spring 2012 Céline Gauthier, Moez Souissi The MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework (MFRAF) models the interconnections between liquidity and solvency in a financial system, with multiple institutions linked through an interbank network. The MFRAF integrates funding liquidity risk as an endogenous outcome of the interactions between solvency risk and the liquidity profiles of banks, which is a complementary approach to the new […] Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, G, G0, G01, G2, G21
May 17, 2012 Conference Summary: New Developments in Payments and Settlement Bank of Canada Review - Spring 2012 Ben Fung, Miguel Molico The Bank of Canada’s annual conference, held in November 2011, brought together leading researchers from universities, central banks and other institutions from around the world. Divided into four sessions plus two keynote addresses, the conference covered such topics as the use of cash and other means of payment in retail transactions, large-value payments systems, and […] Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Bank notes, Central bank research, Financial system regulation and policies, Monetary policy implementation, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E42, G, G2, G28, L, L8, L81
A Note on Central Counterparties in Repo Markets Staff Discussion Paper 2012-4 Hajime Tomura The author introduces a central counterparty (CCP) into a model of a repo market. Without the CCP, there exist multiple equilibria in the model. In one of the equilibria, a repo market emerges as bond dealers and cash investors choose to arrange repos in an over-the-counter bond market. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G2, G24
When Is It Less Costly for Risky Firms to Borrow? Evidence from the Bank Risk- Taking Channel of Monetary Policy Staff Working Paper 2012-10 Teodora Paligorova, João Santos In an investigation of banks’ loan pricing policies in the United States over the past two decades, this study finds supporting evidence for the bank risk-taking channel of monetary policy. We show that banks charge lower spreads when they lend to riskier borrowers relative to the spreads they charge on loans to safer borrowers in periods of low short-term rates compared to periods of high short-term rates. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Monetary policy framework JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21
February 23, 2012 Household Insolvency in Canada Bank of Canada Review - Winter 2011-2012 Jason Allen, H. Evren Damar With increasing levels of household debt in recent years, the number of households that may be vulnerable to a negative economic shock is rising as well. Decisions made by both the debtor and the creditor can contribute to insolvency. This article presents some stylized facts about insolvency in Canada’s household sector and analyzes the role of creditors in insolvencies. The average debt of an individual filing for bankruptcy is more than 1.5 times that of an average Canadian household; bankruptcy filers tend to be unemployed or in low-wage jobs, and are typically renters. The article reports that banks that approve more loans per branch, which is interpreted as less-intensive use of soft information (such as the loan officer’s assessment of the applicant’s character), experience more client bankruptcies. This finding has important policy implications, because financial institutions that do not use soft information risk further deterioration in their lending portfolios. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services JEL Code(s): D, D4, G, G2
Price Competition and Concentration in Search and Negotiation Markets: Evidence from Mortgage Lending Staff Working Paper 2012-4 Jason Allen, Robert Clark, Jean-François Houde This paper examines the impact of bank consolidation on mortgage rates in order to evaluate the extent to which mortgage markets are competitive. Mortgage markets are decentralized and so rates are determined through a search and negotiation process. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services, Interest rates JEL Code(s): G, G2, L, L1
Bank Leverage Regulation and Macroeconomic Dynamics Staff Working Paper 2011-32 Ian Christensen, Césaire Meh, Kevin Moran This paper assesses the merits of countercyclical bank balance sheet regulation for the stabilization of financial and economic cycles and examines its interaction with monetary policy. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Financial institutions, Financial system regulation and policies, Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, E5, E52, G, G2, G21
Do Low Interest Rates Sow the Seeds of Financial Crises? Staff Working Paper 2011-31 Simona Cociuba, Malik Shukayev, Alexander Ueberfeldt A view advanced in the aftermath of the late-2000s financial crisis is that lower than optimal interest rates lead to excessive risk taking by financial intermediaries. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial system regulation and policies, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): D, D5, D53, E, E4, E44, E5, E52, G, G2, G28
What Matters in Determining Capital Surcharges for Systemically Important Financial Institutions? Staff Discussion Paper 2011-9 Céline Gauthier, Toni Gravelle, Xuezhi Liu, Moez Souissi One way of internalizing the externalities that each individual bank imposes on the rest of the financial system is to impose capital surcharges on them in line with their systemic importance. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): C, C1, C15, C8, C81, E, E4, E44, G, G0, G01, G2, G21