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We study constrained-efficient bank capital regulation in a model with market-imposed equity requirements. Banks hold equity buffers to insure against sudden loss of access to funding. However, in the model, banks choose to only partially self-insure because equity is privately costly.

This paper studies the period in Canada when both private bank notes and government-issued notes (Dominion notes) were simultaneously in circulation. Because both of these notes shared many of the characteristics of today's digital currencies, the experience with these notes can be used to draw lessons about how digital currencies might perform.

The uncertainty around future changes to the Federal Reserve target rate varies over time. In our results, the main driver of uncertainty is a “path” factor signaling information about future policy actions, which is filtered from federal funds futures data.

What path should policy-makers select for the nominal rate when faced with a liquidity trap during which the effective lower bound binds?

How much discretion should local financial regulators in a banking union have in accommodating local credit demand? I analyze this question in an economy where local regulators privately observe expected output from high lending. They do not fully internalize default costs from high lending since deposit insurance cannot be priced fairly.

Digital currencies have attracted strong interest in recent years and have the potential to become widely adopted for use in making payments. Public authorities and central banks around the world are closely monitoring developments in digital currencies and studying their implications for the economy, the financial system and central banks.

The Bank of Canada’s framework for market operations and liquidity provision describes how and when central bank liquidity might be offered with regards to the implementation of monetary policy and for supporting the stability of the Canadian financial system. Market participants can therefore plan their transactions knowing that the Bank stands ready to help manage system liquidity to support its objectives for monetary policy and financial stability.

Central banks contribute importantly to the promotion of financial stability given their sys-tem-wide macro-financial perspective and existing roles as lender of last resort and overseer of systemic payment systems. Since the global financial crisis, the financial system role of central banks has expanded to place more emphasis on the prevention of financial stress and crises. Central banks work with other responsible authorities to enhance financial system resilience and to assess and mitigate financial vulnerabilities and systemic risk.

We analyze the impact of interest rate policy on financial stability in an environment where banks can experience runs on their short-term liabilities, forcing them to sell assets at fire-sale prices.

We develop a model in which a financial intermediary’s investment in risky assets—risk taking—is excessive due to limited liability and deposit insurance and characterize the policy tools that implement efficient risk taking.