Market Valuation and Risk Assessment of Canadian Banks Staff Working Paper 2004-34 Ying Liu, Mingwei Yuan, Eli Papakirykos The authors apply the asset-valuation model developed by Rabinovitch (1989) to six publicly traded Canadian banks over the period 1982–2002. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions JEL Code(s): G, G1, G12, G2, G21
The New Basel Capital Accord and the Cyclical Behaviour of Bank Capital Staff Working Paper 2004-30 Mark Illing, Graydon Paulin The authors conduct a counterfactual simulation of the proposed rules under the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), including the revised treatment of expected and unexpected credit losses proposed by the Basel Committee in October 2003. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G28, K, K2, K23
Uninsurable Investment Risks Staff Working Paper 2004-29 Césaire Meh, Vincenzo Quadrini The authors study a general-equilibrium economy in which agents have the ability to invest in a risky technology. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Financial institutions, Financial markets JEL Code(s): D, D3, D31, E, E2, E21, G, G0
Regulatory Changes and Financial Structure: The Case of Canada Staff Working Paper 2004-26 Christian Calmès The author documents some stylized facts about the Canadian financial structure. He explores these empirical facts in the context of Canadian financial legislation and finds that, over the 1990s, Canadian businesses became more heavily dependent on financial markets as their primary source of external funding. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services, Recent economic and financial developments JEL Code(s): G, G2, G20, G21
Competition in Banking: A Review of the Literature Staff Working Paper 2004-24 Carol Ann Northcott The author reviews the theoretical and empirical literature to examine the traditional perception that the following trade-off exists between economic efficiency and stability in the banking system: a competitive banking system is more efficient and therefore important to growth, but market power is necessary for stability in the banking system. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G28, L, L1, L11, L12, L13, L16
When Bad Things Happen to Good Banks: Contagious Bank Runs and Currency Crises Staff Working Paper 2004-18 Raphael Solomon The author develops a twin crisis model featuring multiple banks. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Exchange rates, Financial institutions JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, F, F3, F30, G, G2, G21
Bank Capital, Agency Costs, and Monetary Policy Staff Working Paper 2004-6 Césaire Meh, Kevin Moran Evidence suggests that banks, like firms, face financial frictions when raising funds. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Financial institutions, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, E5, E52, G, G2, G21
Anatomy of a Twin Crisis Staff Working Paper 2003-41 Raphael Solomon The author presents a model of a twin crisis, in which foreign and domestic residents play a banking game. Both "honest" and run equilibria of the post-deposit subgame exist; some run equilibria lead to a currency crisis, as agents convert domestic currency to foreign currency. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Exchange rates, Financial institutions JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, F, F3, F30, G, G2, G21
Excess Collateral in the LVTS: How Much is Too Much? Staff Working Paper 2003-36 Kim McPhail, Anastasia Vakos The authors build a theoretical model that generates demand for collateral by Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) participants under the assumption that they minimize the cost of holding and managing collateral for LVTS purposes. The model predicts that the optimal amount of collateral held by each LVTS participant depends on the opportunity cost of collateral, the transactions costs of acquiring assets used as collateral and transferring them in and out of the LVTS, and the distribution of an LVTS participant's payment flows in the LVTS. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, G, G2, G21
Essays on Financial Stability Technical Report No. 95 John Chant, Alexandra Lai, Mark Illing, Fred Daniel The four essays published here provide a useful overview for anyone interested in understanding the issues and policy environment surrounding financial system stability. Content Type(s): Staff research, Technical reports Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets JEL Code(s): G, G2, G28