Measuring Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions: An Extreme Value Theory Approach Staff Working Paper 2011-19 Toni Gravelle, Fuchun Li In this paper, we define a financial institution’s contribution to financial systemic risk as the increase in financial systemic risk conditional on the crash of the financial institution. The higher the contribution is, the more systemically important is the institution for the system. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): C, C1, C14, C5, C58, G, G2, G21, G3, G32
August 18, 2011 The BoC-GEM-Fin: Banking in the Global Economy Bank of Canada Review - Summer 2011 Carlos De Resende, René Lalonde This article describes the Bank of Canada’s version of the Global Economy Model structured to incorporate an active banking system that features an interbank market and cross-border lending. After describing the new model, the authors use it to examine the responses of selected U.S. and Canadian macroeconomic variables to a “credit crunch” in the United States and also to study the impact of changes in the regulatory limits to bank leverage in Canada. They also discuss the relative merits of a monetary policy framework based on inflation targeting and one based on price-level targeting in the presence of shocks to the U.S. and Canadian banking sectors. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Economic models, Financial institutions, Financial system regulation and policies, Monetary policy framework
August 18, 2011 Bank Balance Sheets, Deleveraging and the Transmission Mechanism Bank of Canada Review - Summer 2011 Césaire Meh The author investigates the influence of bank capital on economic activity, using a macroeconomic model that incorporates an explicit role for financial intermediation. The analysis focuses on the role of a “bank-capital channel” in propagating and amplifying monetary policy actions and other shocks. The question of whether weaker bank balance sheets make the economy more vulnerable to adverse shocks is examined, together with the impact of initiatives, such as countercyclical capital buffers, on the transmission of monetary policy and other shocks to the real economy. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Economic models, Financial institutions, Financial system regulation and policies, Monetary policy transmission
Analyzing Default Risk and Liquidity Demand during a Financial Crisis: The Case of Canada Staff Working Paper 2011-17 Jason Allen, Ali Hortaçsu, Jakub Kastl This paper explores the reliability of using prices of credit default swap contracts (CDS) as indicators of default probabilities during the 2007/2008 financial crisis. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E42, E5, E58, G, G0, G01, G2, G28
Bank Loans for Private and Public Firms in a Credit Crunch Staff Working Paper 2011-13 Jason Allen, Teodora Paligorova Banks reliance on short-term funding has increased over time. While an effective source of financing in good times, the 2007 financial crisis has exposed the vulnerability of banks and ultimately firms to such a liability structure. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions JEL Code(s): G, G0, G01, G2, G20
Discounting in Mortgage Markets Staff Working Paper 2011-3 Jason Allen, Robert Clark, Jean-François Houde This paper studies discounting in mortgage markets. Using transaction-level data on Canadian mortgages, we document that over time there's been an increase in the average discount, along with substantial dispersion. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services JEL Code(s): D, D4, G, G2, G21, L, L0
The Impact of Liquidity on Bank Profitability Staff Working Paper 2010-38 Étienne Bordeleau, Christopher Graham The recent crisis has underlined the importance of sound bank liquidity management. In response, regulators are devising new liquidity standards with the aim of making the financial system more stable and resilient. In this paper, the authors analyse the impact of liquid asset holdings on bank profitability for a sample of large U.S. and Canadian banks. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G3, G32, G33
The Macroeconomic Implications of Changes in Bank Capital and Liquidity Requirements in Canada: Insights from the BoC-GEM-FIN Staff Discussion Paper 2010-16 Carlos De Resende, Ali Dib, Nikita Perevalov The authors use simulations within the BoC-GEM-FIN, the Bank of Canada's version of the Global Economy Model with financial frictions in both the demand and supply sides of the credit market, to investigate the macroeconomic implications of changing bank regulations on the Canadian economy. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Economic models, Financial institutions, Financial stability, International topics JEL Code(s): E, E3, E32, E4, E44, E5, G, G1, G2
Adverse Selection, Liquidity, and Market Breakdown Staff Working Paper 2010-32 Koralai Kirabaeva This paper studies the interaction between adverse selection, liquidity risk and beliefs about systemic risk in determining market liquidity, asset prices and welfare. Even a small amount of adverse selection in the asset market can lead to fire-sale pricing and possibly to a market breakdown if it is accompanied by a flight-to-liquidity, a misassessment of systemic risk, or uncertainty about asset values. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial stability JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, G, G0, G01, G1, G11
Losses from Simulated Defaults in Canada's Large Value Transfer System Staff Discussion Paper 2010-14 Nellie Zhang, Tom Hossfeld The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) loss-sharing mechanism was designed to ensure that, in the event of a one-participant default, the collateral pledged by direct members of the system would be sufficient to cover the largest possible net debit position of a defaulting participant. However, the situation may not hold if the indirect effects of the defaults are taken into consideration, or if two participants default during the same payment cycle. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E47, G, G2, G21