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We model how securities dealers respond to regulations on leverage, position and liquidity such as those imposed by the Basel III framework. We show that while asset prices exhibit greater price impact, bid-ask spreads do not change and trading volumes may even increase.

We document that the structure of syndicates affects loan renegotiations. Lead banks with large retained shares have positive effects on renegotiations. In contrast, more diverse syndicates deter renegotiations, but only for credit lines.

In Toward More Resilient Markets: Over-the-Counter Derivatives Reform in Canada, Michael Mueller and André Usche show that the implementation of derivatives market reforms in Canada is well under way and has lessened vulnerabilities. But accompanying changes to market structure have both positive and negative effects that require ongoing attention from authorities.

The Rise of Mortgage Finance Companies in Canada: Benefits and Vulnerabilities, by Don Coletti, Marc-André Gosselin and Cameron MacDonald, examines the increased importance of mortgage finance companies (MFCs) in the Canadian mortgage market. The authors discuss the MFC business model, highlighting MFCs’ relationship with mortgage brokers and banks, as well as the benefits they bring to Canadian borrowers. The authors conclude with a discussion of the impact of MFCs on financial system vulnerabilities.

In Monitoring Shadow Banking in Canada: A Hybrid Approach, Bo Young Chang, Michael Januska, Gitanjali Kumar and André Usche discuss how lending that occurs outside the traditional banking system provides benefits to the economy but must be monitored carefully for potential financial sector vulnerabilities. They describe how the Bank defines and measures shadow banking and how it assesses vulnerabilities in the sector, using an approach that examines both markets and entities.

We document the outcome of an options decimalization pilot on Canada’s derivatives exchange. Decimalization improves measures of liquidity and price efficiency. The impact differs by the moneyness of an option and is greatest for out-of-the-money options.

Production efficiency and financial stability do not necessarily go hand in hand. With heterogeneity in banks’ abilities to screen borrowers, the market for loans becomes segmented and a self-competition mechanism arises. When heterogeneity increases, the intensive and extensive margins have opposite effects.

How much discretion should local financial regulators in a banking union have in accommodating local credit demand? I analyze this question in an economy where local regulators privately observe expected output from high lending. They do not fully internalize default costs from high lending since deposit insurance cannot be priced fairly.

The primary focus of this paper is to study conflict of interest in the brokerage market. Brokers face a conflict of interest when the commissions they receive from investors differ from the costs imposed by different trading venues.

Emergency Lending Assistance (ELA) is a discretionary last-resort collateralized loan or ad-vance by the Bank of Canada to eligible financial institutions (FIs) and financial market infrastructures (FMIs) facing serious liquidity problems. In December 2015, the Bank revised its ELA policy to (i) replace the requirement for an FI’s solvency with the requirement for a credible recovery and resolution framework; (ii) include mortgages as eligible collateral; and (iii) clarify both the eligibility requirements for FMIs and provincially regulated deposit-taking FIs.