The Central Bank Strikes Back! Credibility of Monetary Policy under Fiscal Influence Staff Working Paper 2022-11 Antoine Camous, Dmitry Matveev Central banks in many advanced economies enjoy a high degree of independence, which protects monetary policy decisions from political influence. But how should independent central banks react if pressured by fiscal policy-makers? We examine whether a central bank should design a monetary policy framework that prescribes acting conditionally on how fiscal policy behaves. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credibility, Fiscal policy, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E0, E02, E5, E52, E58, E6, E61, E62
December 15, 2021 Building on success Speech summary Tiff Macklem Empire Club of Canada Toronto, Ontario Governor Tiff Macklem speaks about the Bank of Canada’s monetary policy framework review and the agreement between the Government of Canada and the Bank to renew the 2 percent inflation target. Content Type(s): Press, Speeches and appearances, Speech summaries Topic(s): Central bank research, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19), Credibility, Expectations, Inflation and prices, Inflation targets, Labour markets, Monetary policy, Monetary policy and uncertainty, Monetary policy communications, Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy implementation, Recent economic and financial developments
December 15, 2021 Our monetary policy framework: Continuity, clarity and commitment Remarks (delivered virtually) Tiff Macklem Empire Club of Canada Toronto, Ontario Governor Tiff Macklem discusses the Bank of Canada’s renewed monetary policy framework. He reviews Canada’s experience with flexible inflation targeting and explains why the Bank and the Government of Canada agreed to renew the 2 percent inflation target. Content Type(s): Press, Speeches and appearances, Remarks Topic(s): Central bank research, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19), Credibility, Expectations, Inflation and prices, Inflation targets, Labour markets, Monetary policy, Monetary policy and uncertainty, Monetary policy communications, Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy implementation, Recent economic and financial developments
Measuring and Evaluating Strategic Communications at the Bank of Canada Staff Discussion Paper 2021-9 Annie Portelance The Bank of Canada’s Communications Department has developed a framework to quantify and qualify the Bank’s communications efforts and their results. Using data-based measurement and evaluation, the department can assess the impact of the Bank’s communications activities and gauge the department’s contribution to the Bank’s overall goals. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Central bank research, Credibility, Monetary policy communications JEL Code(s): D, D8, D83
August 27, 2020 The imperative for public engagement Remarks (delivered virtually) Tiff Macklem Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium Jackson Hole, Wyoming Governor Tiff Macklem talks about the need for the Bank to be clear, relatable and understandable when it communicates with the public. Content Type(s): Press, Speeches and appearances, Remarks Topic(s): Coronavirus disease (COVID-19), Credibility, Monetary policy, Monetary policy and uncertainty
March 6, 2020 Under the microscope James (Jim) C. MacGee, Rhys R. Mendes Evaluating our approach to monetary policy Content Type(s): Publications, The Economy, Plain and Simple Topic(s): Credibility, Inflation targets, Inflation: costs and benefits, Interest rates, Monetary policy framework, Price stability
The Power of Helicopter Money Revisited: A New Keynesian Perspective Staff Discussion Paper 2020-1 Thomas J. Carter, Rhys R. Mendes We analyze money financing of fiscal transfers (helicopter money) in two simple New Keynesian models: a “textbook” model in which all money is non-interest-bearing (e.g., all money is currency), and a more realistic model with interest-bearing reserves. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Credibility, Economic models, Fiscal policy, Inflation targets, Interest rates, Monetary policy, Monetary policy and uncertainty, Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): E, E1, E12, E4, E41, E43, E5, E51, E52, E58, E6, E61, E63
Social Learning and Monetary Policy at the Effective Lower Bound Staff Working Paper 2020-2 Jasmina Arifovic, Alex Grimaud, Isabelle Salle, Gauthier Vermandel This research develops a model in which the economy is directly influenced by how pessimistic or optimistic economic agents are about the future. The agents may hold different views and update them as new economic data become available. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Central bank research, Credibility, Economic models, Monetary policy, Monetary policy communications JEL Code(s): C, C8, C82, E, E3, E32, E5, E52
Furor over the Fed : Presidential Tweets and Central Bank Independence Staff Analytical Note 2019-33 Antoine Camous, Dmitry Matveev We illustrate how market data can be informative about the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. Federal funds futures are private contracts that reflect investor’s expectations about monetary policy decisions. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Central bank research, Credibility, Financial markets, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, E5, E52, E58
Inflation Targeting and Liquidity Traps Under Endogenous Credibility Staff Working Paper 2019-9 Cars Hommes, Joep Lustenhouwer Policy implications are derived for an inflation-targeting central bank, whose credibility is endogenous and depends on its past ability to achieve its targets. This is done in a New Keynesian framework with heterogeneous and boundedly rational expectations. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Credibility, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): C, C6, C62, E, E3, E32, E5, E52