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This note analyzes different economic models of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) ecosystem where the central bank chooses different levels of market involvement and usage of policy levers. The analysis suggests that there are trade-offs between the costs to the central bank and its ability to achieve policy goals like universal access.

How does the transmission of monetary policy change when a central bank digital currency (CBDC) is introduced in the economy? Does CBDC design matter? We study these questions in a general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, liquidity frictions, and a banking sector where commercial banks face a leverage constraint.

A well-functioning monetary system is characterized by public and private forms of money that exchange at par as value flows freely between them. A relevant retail public money—whether in the form of cash, a central bank digital currency or both—is a necessary component of such a monetary system.

Across several dimensions of lender of last resort policy, I highlight broad changes that have occurred since the 2008–09 global financial crisis and discuss some of the key challenges, choices and considerations facing the designers of central bank liquidity tools today.

This study uses the COVID-19 travel restrictions to estimate foreign demand for Canadian banknotes. It reveals that international visitors accounted for about 10% of all $100 CAD notes in circulation pre-pandemic, with each visitor carrying an average of $165 in hundred-dollar bills.

In March 2020, the Bank of Canada implemented the Government of Canada Bond Purchase Program, eventually purchasing approximately $340 billion of government bonds. In this paper, we analyze the impact of this program on financial market prices and yields as well as on GDP and inflation.

We assess both the US and Canadian nominal neutral rates to be in the range of 2.25% to 3.25%, somewhat higher than the range of 2.0% to 3.0% in 2023. The assessed range is back to the level it was at in April 2019.

We examine the optimal amount of user anonymity in a central bank digital currency in the context of bank lending. Anonymity, defined as the lender’s inability to discern an entrepreneur’s actions that enable fund diversion, influences the choice of payment instrument due to its impact on a bank’s lending decisions.

To what extent does a central bank digital currency (CBDC) compete with bank deposits? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a structural model where each household chooses which financial institution to deposit their digital money with.

While climate change was largely tackled by government policies in the past, central banks are increasingly grappling with the risks climate change poses. They are evaluating their operational policies to reflect these risks and the transition to a net-zero economy. This paper explores the trade-offs and considerations central banks face.