Adverse Selection with Heterogeneously Informed Agents Staff Working Paper 2018-7 Mohammad Davoodalhosseini A model of over-the-counter markets is proposed. Some asset buyers are informed in that they can identify high quality assets. Heterogeneous sellers with private information choose what type of buyers they want to trade with. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Economic models, Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D40, D8, D82, D83, G, G0, G01, G1, G10, G2, G20
Constrained Efficiency with Adverse Selection and Directed Search Staff Working Paper 2017-15 Mohammad Davoodalhosseini Constrained efficient allocation (CE) is characterized in a model of adverse selection and directed search (Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010)). CE is defined to be the allocation that maximizes welfare, the ex-ante utility of all agents, subject to the frictions of the environment. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Economic models, Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, D83, E, E2, E24, G, G1, J, J3, J31, J6, J64
Asset Encumbrance, Bank Funding and Financial Fragility Staff Working Paper 2016-16 Kartik Anand, Prasanna Gai, James Chapman, Toni Ahnert In this piece we show that a limit on the level of asset encumbrance and minimum capital requirements are effective tools for minimizing the incentive for banks to take excessive risk. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, G, G0, G01, G2, G21, G28
A Microfounded Design of Interconnectedness-Based Macroprudential Policy Staff Working Paper 2016-6 Jose Fique To address the challenges posed by global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recommended an “additional loss absorbency requirement” for these institutions. Along these lines, I develop a microfounded design of capital surcharges that target the interconnectedness component of systemic risk. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, D85, G, G2, G21, G28
Risk Sharing in the Presence of a Public Good Staff Working Paper 2015-27 Josef Schroth This paper studies an economy where agents can spend resources on consuming a private good and on funding a public good. There is asymmetric information regarding agents’ relative preference for private versus public good consumption. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, Fiscal policy JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, D86, E, E6, E62, H, H2, H21, H23, H7, H77
Managerial Compensation Duration and Stock Price Manipulation Staff Working Paper 2015-25 Josef Schroth I build a model of optimal managerial compensation where managers each have a privately observed propensity to manipulate short-term stock prices. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Economic models, Labour markets, Recent economic and financial developments JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, G, G1, G14, G3, G30, M, M1, M12
A Wake-Up-Call Theory of Contagion Staff Working Paper 2015-14 Christoph Bertsch, Toni Ahnert We propose a novel theory of financial contagion. We study global coordination games of regime change in two regions with an initially uncertain correlation of regional fundamentals. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Exchange rates, Financial stability, International financial markets JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, F, F3, G, G0, G01
The Threat of Counterfeiting in Competitive Search Equilibrium Staff Working Paper 2013-22 Enchuan Shao Recent studies in monetary theory show that if buyers can use lotteries to signal the quality of bank notes, counterfeiting does not occur in a pooling equilibrium. In this paper, I investigate the robustness of this non-existence result by considering an alternative trading mechanism. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Bank notes JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, D83, E, E4, E42
Money and Price Posting under Private Information Staff Working Paper 2011-22 Mei Dong, Janet Hua Jiang We study price posting with undirected search in a search-theoretic monetary model with divisible money and divisible goods. Ex ante homogeneous buyers experience match specific preference shocks in bilateral trades. The shocks follow a continuous distribution and the realization of the shocks is private information. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Economic models, Inflation and prices JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, D83, E, E3, E31
Counterfeit Quality and Verification in a Monetary Exchange Staff Working Paper 2011-4 Ben Fung, Enchuan Shao Recent studies on counterfeiting in a monetary search framework show that counterfeiting does not occur in a monetary equilibrium. These findings are inconsistent with the observation that counterfeiting of bank notes has been a serious problem in some countries. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Bank notes JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, D83, E, E4, E42, E5, E50