Inequality in Parental Transfers, Borrowing Constraints and Optimal Higher Education Subsidies Staff Working Paper 2019-7 Youngmin Park This paper studies optimal education subsidies when parental transfers are unequally distributed across students and cannot be publicly observed. After documenting substantial inequality in parental transfers among US college students with similar family resources, I examine its implications for how the education subsidy should vary with schooling level and family resources to minimize inefficiencies generated by borrowing constraints. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Fiscal policy, Potential output, Productivity JEL Code(s): D, D1, D14, D6, D61, D64, D8, D82, I, I2, I22, J, J2, J24
Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences Staff Working Paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61
Monetary Policy Tradeoffs Between Financial Stability and Price Stability Staff Working Paper 2016-49 Malik Shukayev, Alexander Ueberfeldt We analyze the impact of interest rate policy on financial stability in an environment where banks can experience runs on their short-term liabilities, forcing them to sell assets at fire-sale prices. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Financial stability, Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): D, D6, D62, E, E3, E32, E4, E44, G, G0, G01
Comparison of Auction Formats in Canadian Government Auctions Staff Working Paper 2009-5 Olivier Armantier, Nourredine Lafhel Using a rich sample of Canadian government securities auctions, we estimate the structural parameters of a share-auction model accounting for asymmetries across bidders. We find little evidence of asymmetries between participants at Canadian government nominal bond auctions. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Debt management, Financial markets, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D44, D6, D63, G, G2, G28