A Policy Model to Analyze Macroprudential Regulations and Monetary Policy Staff Working Paper 2014-6 Sami Alpanda, Gino Cateau, Césaire Meh We construct a small-open-economy, New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model with real-financial linkages to analyze the effects of financial shocks and macroprudential policies on the Canadian economy. Our model has four key features. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E1, E17, E3, E32, E4, E44, F, F4, F41
Lessons from the Financial Crisis: Bank Performance and Regulatory Reform Staff Discussion Paper 2013-4 Neville Arjani, Graydon Paulin The financial systems of some countries fared materially better than others during the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G28
The ‘Celtic Crisis’: Guarantees, Transparency and Systemic Liquidity Risk Staff Working Paper 2013-31 Philipp König, Kartik Anand, Frank Heinemann Bank liability guarantee schemes have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to shore up investor confidence and prevent bank runs. However, as the experiences of some European countries, most notably Ireland, have demonstrated, the credibility and effectiveness of these guarantees are crucially intertwined with the sovereign’s funding risks. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): D, D8, D89, G, G0, G01, G2, G28
Why Do Emerging Markets Liberalize Capital Outflow Controls? Fiscal versus Net Capital Flow Concerns Staff Working Paper 2013-21 Joshua Aizenman, Gurnain Pasricha In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the factors that motivated emerging economies to change their capital outflow controls in recent decades. Liberalization of capital outflow controls can allow emerging-market economies (EMEs) to reduce net capital inflow (NKI) pressures, but may cost their governments the fiscal revenues that external financial repression generates. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Debt management, Financial system regulation and policies, International topics, Recent economic and financial developments JEL Code(s): F, F3, F32, G, G1, G15
February 21, 2013 Conference Summary: Financial Intermediation and Vulnerabilities Bank of Canada Review - Winter 2012-2013 Jason Allen, James Chapman, Ian Christensen The Bank of Canada’s annual economic conference, held in October 2012, brought together experts from across Canada and around the world to discuss key issues concerning financial intermediation and vulnerabilities. The conference covered such topics as household finances and their relationship to financial stability, as well as bank regulation, securitization and shadow banking. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Central bank research, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G2
Real-financial Linkages through Loan Default and Bank Capital Staff Working Paper 2013-3 Tamon Takamura Many studies in macroeconomics argue that financial frictions do not amplify the impacts of real shocks. This finding is based on models without endogenous default on loans and bank capital. Using a model featuring endogenous interactions between firm default and bank capital, this paper revisits the propagation mechanisms of real and financial shocks. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, Interest rates JEL Code(s): E, E3, E32, E4, E44, E6, E69
Financial Crisis Resolution Staff Working Paper 2012-42 Josef Schroth This paper studies a dynamic version of the Holmstrom-Tirole model of intermediated finance. I show that competitive equilibria are not constrained efficient when the economy experiences a financial crisis. A pecuniary externality entails that banks’ desire to accumulate capital over time aggravates the scarcity of informed capital during the financial crisis. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): D, D5, D53, E, E6, E60, G, G0, G01, G1, G10, G18
November 15, 2012 Financial Transaction Taxes: International Experiences, Issues and Feasibility Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2012 Anna Pomeranets The financial transaction tax (FTT) is a policy idea with a long history that, in the wake of the global financial crisis, has attracted renewed interest in some quarters. This article examines the evidence of the impact of an FTT on market quality and explores a few of the practical issues surrounding the implementation of an FTT. Proponents argue that an FTT will generate substantial tax revenues and reduce market volatility. The majority of the empirical evidence, however, supports the arguments of opponents of the tax who assert that an FTT reduces volume and liquidity and increases volatility. In addition, there are numerous challenges in implementing an FTT, which may reduce the intended revenues. Whether an FTT is beneficial hinges on its effect on market quality and its ability to raise revenues. However, there are many unanswered questions regarding its design. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G0, G01, G1, G10, G18
November 15, 2012 Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2012 Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Héctor Pérez Saiz, Joshua Slive Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): G, G1, G18, G2, G21, L, L1, L13
November 15, 2012 The Changing Landscape for Retail Payments in Canada and the Implications for the Demand for Cash Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2012 Carlos Arango, Kim Huynh, Ben Fung, Gerald Stuber Over the past 20 years, there has been a major shift away from the use of paper-based retail payment instruments, such as cash and cheques, toward electronic means of payment, such as debit cards and credit cards. Recent Bank of Canada research on consumers’ choice of payment instruments indicates that cash is frequently used for transactions with low values because of its speed, ease of use and wide acceptance, while debit and credit cards are more commonly used for transactions with higher values because of perceived attributes such as safety and record keeping. While innovations in retail payments currently being introduced into the Canadian marketplace could lead to a further reduction in the use of cash over the longer term, the implications for the use of cash of some of the structural and regulatory developments under way are less clear. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Bank notes, Econometric and statistical methods, Financial system regulation and policies, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C8, C83, E, E4, E42, G, G2, G28