Consumer Interest Rates and Retail Mutual Fund Flows Staff Working Paper 2012-39 Jesus Sierra This paper documents a link between the real and financial sides of the economy. We find that retail equity mutual fund flows in Canada are negatively related to current and past changes in a component of the prime and 5-year mortgage rates that is uncorrelated with government rates. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial services, Interest rates JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G23
November 15, 2012 Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2012 Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Héctor Pérez Saiz, Joshua Slive Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): G, G1, G18, G2, G21, L, L1, L13
November 15, 2012 Monetary Policy and the Risk-Taking Channel: Insights from the Lending Behaviour of Banks Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2012 Teodora Paligorova, Jesus Sierra The financial crisis of 2007-09 and the subsequent extended period of historically low real interest rates have revived the question of whether economic agents are willing to take on more risk when interest rates remain low for a prolonged time period. This increased appetite for risk, which causes economic agents to search for investment assets and strategies that generate higher investment returns, has been called the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Recent academic research on banks suggests that lending policies in times of low interest rates can be consistent with the existence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy in Europe, South America, the United States and Canada. Specifically, studies find that the terms of loans to risky borrowers become less stringent in periods of low interest rates. This risk-taking channel may amplify the effects of traditional transmission mechanisms, resulting in the creation of excessive credit. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial institutions, Monetary policy framework JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, G, G2, G21
The Role of Credit in International Business Cycles Staff Working Paper 2012-36 TengTeng Xu This paper examines the role of bank credit in modeling and forecasting business cycle fluctuations, and investigates the international transmission of US credit shocks, using a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) framework and associated country-specific error correction models. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Credit and credit aggregates, Econometric and statistical methods, International financial markets JEL Code(s): C, C3, C32, E, E3, E32, E4, E44, G, G2, G21
Canadian Bank Balance-Sheet Management: Breakdown by Types of Canadian Financial Institutions Staff Discussion Paper 2012-7 David Xiao Chen, H. Evren Damar, Hani Soubra, Yaz Terajima The authors document leverage, capital and liquidity ratios of banks in Canada. These ratios are important indicators of different types of risk with respect to a bank’s balance‐sheet management. Particular attention is given to the observations by different types of banks, including small banks that historically received less attention. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G28
Price Negotiation in Differentiated Products Markets: Evidence from the Canadian Mortgage Market Staff Working Paper 2012-30 Jason Allen, Robert Clark, Jean-François Houde This paper measures market power in a decentralized market where contracts are determined through a search and negotiation process. The mortgage industry has many institutional features which suggest competitiveness: homogeneous contracts, negotiable rates, and, for a given consumer, common lending costs across lenders. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial services, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, G, G2, G21, L, L2, L22
Efficiency and Bargaining Power in the Interbank Loan Market Staff Working Paper 2012-29 Jason Allen, James Chapman, Federico Echenique, Matthew Shum Using detailed loan transactions-level data we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market, and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no-arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C7, C71, E, E5, E58, G, G2, G21, G28
August 16, 2012 An Analysis of Indicators of Balance-Sheet Risks at Canadian Financial Institutions Bank of Canada Review - Summer 2012 David Xiao Chen, H. Evren Damar, Hani Soubra, Yaz Terajima This article examines four indicators of balance-sheet risks—leverage, capital, asset liquidity and funding—among different types of financial institutions in Canada over the past three decades. It also discusses relevant developments in the banking sector that could have contributed to the observed dynamics. The authors find that the various risk indicators decreased during the period for most of the non-Big Six financial institutions, but remained relatively unchanged for the Big Six banks. In addition, the balance-sheet risk indicators became more heterogeneous across financial institutions. The observed overall decline and increased heterogeneity follow certain regulatory changes, such as the introduction of the liquidity guidelines on funding in 1995 and the implementation of bank-specific leverage requirements in 2000. Given that these regulations required more balance-sheet risk management, they have likely contributed to the increased resilience of the banking sector. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G28
The Ex-Ante Versus Ex-Post Effect of Public Guarantees Staff Working Paper 2012-22 H. Evren Damar, Reint Gropp, Adi Mordel In October 2006, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) introduced new ratings for banks that account for the potential of government support. The rating changes are not a reflection of any changes in the respective banks’ credit fundamentals. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G28, G3, G32
May 17, 2012 Understanding Systemic Risk in the Banking Sector: A MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework Bank of Canada Review - Spring 2012 Céline Gauthier, Moez Souissi The MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework (MFRAF) models the interconnections between liquidity and solvency in a financial system, with multiple institutions linked through an interbank network. The MFRAF integrates funding liquidity risk as an endogenous outcome of the interactions between solvency risk and the liquidity profiles of banks, which is a complementary approach to the new […] Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, G, G0, G01, G2, G21