The Impact of Retail Payment Innovations on Cash Usage Staff Working Paper 2012-14 Ben Fung, Kim Huynh, Leonard Sabetti Many predict that innovations in retail payment may render cash obsolete. We investigate this possibility in the context of recent payment innovations such as contactless-credit and stored-value cards. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Financial services, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C3, C35, C8, C83, E, E4, E41
A Note on Central Counterparties in Repo Markets Staff Discussion Paper 2012-4 Hajime Tomura The author introduces a central counterparty (CCP) into a model of a repo market. Without the CCP, there exist multiple equilibria in the model. In one of the equilibria, a repo market emerges as bond dealers and cash investors choose to arrange repos in an over-the-counter bond market. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G2, G24
November 17, 2011 Liquidity Provision and Collateral Haircuts in Payments Systems Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2011 James Chapman, Jonathan Chiu, Miguel Molico Central banks play a pivotal role in well-functioning payments systems by providing liquidity via collateralized lending. This article discusses the role of collateral and haircut policy in central bank lending, as well as the distinguishing features of the central bank’s policy relative to private sector practices. It presents a model that explicitly incorporates the unique role of central banks in the payments system and argues that central banks must consider how their haircut policies affect the relative price and liquidity of assets, the market’s asset allocation, and the likelihood of participants to default. Furthermore, under extraordinary circumstances, there is a rationale for the central bank to temporarily reduce haircuts or broaden the list of eligible collateral to mitigate the shortage of liquidity in the market. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Central bank research, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems
Analyzing Default Risk and Liquidity Demand during a Financial Crisis: The Case of Canada Staff Working Paper 2011-17 Jason Allen, Ali Hortaçsu, Jakub Kastl This paper explores the reliability of using prices of credit default swap contracts (CDS) as indicators of default probabilities during the 2007/2008 financial crisis. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E42, E5, E58, G, G0, G01, G2, G28
The Impact of Operational Events on the Network Structure of the LVTS Staff Discussion Paper 2011-7 Tom Roberts The author uses a quantitative network analysis approach to assess how participants in the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) respond to partial outages at other banks. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C4, C49, G, G1, G14, G2, G21
Lessons from International Central Counterparties: Benchmarking and Analysis Staff Discussion Paper 2011-4 Alexandre Lazarow Since the financial crisis, attention has focused on central counterparties (CCPs) as a solution to systemic risk for a variety of financial markets, ranging from repurchase agreements and options to swaps. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G0, G01, G1, G14, G18, G2, G28, G3, G38
May 19, 2011 Central Bank Collateral Policy: Insights from Recent Experience Bank of Canada Review - Spring 2011 Lorie Zorn, Alejandro García The collateral policy of central banks played a critical role during the recent financial crisis, as they worked to bolster liquidity and alleviate the funding pressures facing financial institutions. This article examines central bank collateral policy and discusses three areas in which central banks can use their collateral policy to influence financial market practices: promoting greater transparency for securitized products, improving practices related to credit risk, and reducing procyclicality in the management of market risk. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems
May 19, 2011 Supplementary article: Paying with Polymer: Developing Canada’s New Bank Notes Bank of Canada Review - Spring 2011 Charles Spencer In this article, author Charles Spencer reviews the complex process of developing the new series, which represents a dramatic change for Canada. The leading-edge security features made possible by the new substrate, the cost savings of the move to a polymer base and the environmental advantages of the new notes are also examined. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Bank notes, Credibility, Payment clearing and settlement systems
February 17, 2011 Payment Networks: A Review of Recent Research Bank of Canada Review - Winter 2010-2011 James Chapman, Lana Embree, Tom Roberts, Nellie Zhang In this article, the authors review work done at the Bank of Canada and at other central banks with the relatively new application of network analysis to the study of payments systems. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Central bank research, Payment clearing and settlement systems
Losses from Simulated Defaults in Canada's Large Value Transfer System Staff Discussion Paper 2010-14 Nellie Zhang, Tom Hossfeld The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) loss-sharing mechanism was designed to ensure that, in the event of a one-participant default, the collateral pledged by direct members of the system would be sufficient to cover the largest possible net debit position of a defaulting participant. However, the situation may not hold if the indirect effects of the defaults are taken into consideration, or if two participants default during the same payment cycle. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E47, G, G2, G21