On the Wedge Between the PPI and CPI Inflation Indicators Staff Working Paper 2022-5 Shang-Jin Wei, Yinxi Xie We find that the CPI and PPI inflation indexes co-moved strongly throughout the late 20th century, but their correlation has fallen substantially since the early 2000s. We offer a structural explanation for this divergence based on the growth of global supply chains since 2000. This finding offers a unique perspective for the future design of optimal monetary policy. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Inflation and prices, Inflation targets, International topics, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E3, E31, E5, E52, E58, F, F1, F11, F12, F4, F41, F6, F62
Firm Inattention and the Efficacy of Monetary Policy: A Text-Based Approach Staff Working Paper 2022-3 Wenting Song, Samuel Stern How much attention do firms pay to macroeconomic news? Through a novel text-based measure, two facts emerge. First, attention is polarized. Most firms either never or always pay attention to economic conditions. Second, it is countercyclical. During recessions, more firms pay attention, and firms pay greater attention to macroeconomic news. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Inflation and prices, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): D, D8, D83, E, E4, E44, E5, E52
Central Bank Digital Currency and Banking: Macroeconomic Benefits of a Cash-Like Design Staff Working Paper 2021-63 Jonathan Chiu, Mohammad Davoodalhosseini Should a CBDC be more like cash or bank deposits? An interest-bearing, cash-like CBDC not only makes payments more efficient but also increases total demand. This has positive effects on other transactions, inducing more deposit taking and lending and, thus, bank intermediation. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Digital currencies and fintech, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework JEL Code(s): E, E5, E50, E58
Revisiting the Monetary Sovereignty Rationale for CBDCs Staff Discussion Paper 2021-17 Skylar Brooks One argument for central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) is that without them, private and foreign digital monies could displace domestic currencies, threatening the central bank’s monetary policy and lender of last resort capabilities. I revisit this monetary sovereignty rationale and offer a wider view—one that considers a broader set of currency functions and captures important cross-country variation. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Debt management, Digital currencies and fintech, Exchange rate regimes, Financial stability, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E4, E41, E42, E5, E52, E58, H, H1, H12, H6, H63
December 15, 2021 Building on success Speech summary Tiff Macklem Empire Club of Canada Toronto, Ontario Governor Tiff Macklem speaks about the Bank of Canada’s monetary policy framework review and the agreement between the Government of Canada and the Bank to renew the 2 percent inflation target. Content Type(s): Press, Speeches and appearances, Speech summaries Topic(s): Central bank research, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19), Credibility, Expectations, Inflation and prices, Inflation targets, Labour markets, Monetary policy, Monetary policy and uncertainty, Monetary policy communications, Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy implementation, Recent economic and financial developments
December 15, 2021 Our monetary policy framework: Continuity, clarity and commitment Remarks (delivered virtually) Tiff Macklem Empire Club of Canada Toronto, Ontario Governor Tiff Macklem discusses the Bank of Canada’s renewed monetary policy framework. He reviews Canada’s experience with flexible inflation targeting and explains why the Bank and the Government of Canada agreed to renew the 2 percent inflation target. Content Type(s): Press, Speeches and appearances, Remarks Topic(s): Central bank research, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19), Credibility, Expectations, Inflation and prices, Inflation targets, Labour markets, Monetary policy, Monetary policy and uncertainty, Monetary policy communications, Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy implementation, Recent economic and financial developments
December 13, 2021 Monetary Policy Framework Renewal (December 2021) Commentary and technical data relating to the 2021 renewal. Content Type(s): Background materials Topic(s): Inflation and prices, Monetary policy
Discount Rates, Debt Maturity, and the Fiscal Theory Staff Working Paper 2021-58 Alexandre Corhay, Thilo Kind, Howard Kung, Gonzalo Morales Do bond risk premiums influence the effects of debt maturity operations? Using a model with realistic bond risk premiums, we show that maturity operations have sizable effects on expected inflation and output when the central bank passively responds to inflation and the fiscal authority weakly responds to the debt level. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Fiscal policy, Interest rates, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E4, E43, E44, E6, E63, G, G1, G12
Optimal Monetary Policy According to HANK Staff Working Paper 2021-55 Sushant Acharya, Edouard Challe, Keshav Dogra We study optimal monetary policy in an analytically tractable Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian model. In the model, the central bank has an incentive to reduce consumption inequality in addition to keeping economic activity at its efficient level and inflation stable. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E2, E21, E3, E30, E5, E52, E6, E62, E63
Fiscal and Monetary Stabilization Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: Consequences of Limited Foresight Staff Working Paper 2021-51 Michael Woodford, Yinxi Xie How do outcomes of monetary and fiscal stabilization policies at the zero lower bound change when decision makers have finite planning horizons in the economy? We explore the effects of limited foresight on policy tools and the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Central bank research, Fiscal policy, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E5, E52, E6, E63, E7