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172 Results

Privacy as a Public Good: A Case for Electronic Cash

Staff Working Paper 2019-24 Rodney J. Garratt, Maarten van Oordt
Cash gives users a high level of privacy when making payments, but the use of cash to make payments is declining. People increasingly use debit cards, credit cards or other methods to pay.

Bank Market Power and Central Bank Digital Currency: Theory and Quantitative Assessment

We show that issuing a deposit-like central bank digital currency (CBDC) with a proper interest rate would encourage banks to pay higher interest to keep their customers. Banks would then attract more deposits and offer more loans. Hence, a CBDC would not necessarily crowd out private banking.
April 12, 2019

Panel: International Monetary Fund

CBDC: Should Central Banks issue Digital Currencies?  — Deputy Governor Timothy Lane participates in a panel discussion at International Monetary Fund.
April 11, 2019

Panel: World Bank

Capital Market Development and the FinTech Revolution: Opportunities and Challenges — Senior Deputy Governor Carolyn A. Wilkins participates in a panel discussion at the World Bank.

Crypto ‘Money’: Perspective of a Couple of Canadian Central Bankers

Staff Discussion Paper 2019-1 James Chapman, Carolyn A. Wilkins
The market for cryptoassets has exploded in size in the 10 years since bitcoin was launched. The technology underlying cryptoassets, blockchain, has also been held up as a technology that promises to transform entire industries.

A Framework for Analyzing Monetary Policy in an Economy with E-money

Staff Working Paper 2019-1 Yu Zhu, Scott Hendry
This paper considers an economy where central-bank-issued fiat money competes with privately issued e-money. We study a policy-setting game between the central bank and the e-money issuer and find (1) the optimal monetary policy of the central bank depends on the policy of the private issuer and may deviate from the Friedman rule; (2) multiple equilibria may exist; (3) when the economy approaches a cashless state, the central bank’s optimal policy improves the market power of the e-money issuer and can lead to a discrete decrease in welfare and a discrete increase in inflation; and (4) first best cannot be achieved.
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