Managing GDP Tail Risk Staff Working Paper 2020-3 Thibaut Duprey, Alexander Ueberfeldt Models for macroeconomic forecasts do not usually take into account the risk of a crisis—that is, a sudden large decline in gross domestic product (GDP). However, policy-makers worry about such GDP tail risk because of its large social and economic costs. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Central bank research, Economic models, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, Interest rates, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework JEL Code(s): D, D8, E, E4, E44, E5, E52, E58, G, G0, G01
Social Learning and Monetary Policy at the Effective Lower Bound Staff Working Paper 2020-2 Jasmina Arifovic, Alex Grimaud, Isabelle Salle, Gauthier Vermandel This research develops a model in which the economy is directly influenced by how pessimistic or optimistic economic agents are about the future. The agents may hold different views and update them as new economic data become available. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Central bank research, Credibility, Economic models, Monetary policy, Monetary policy communications JEL Code(s): C, C8, C82, E, E3, E32, E5, E52
Monetary Policy and Government Debt Dynamics Without Commitment Staff Working Paper 2019-52 Dmitry Matveev I show that maturity considerations affect the optimal conduct of monetary and fiscal policy during a period of government debt reduction. I consider a New Keynesian model and study a dynamic game of monetary and fiscal policy authorities without commitment, characterizing the incentives that drive the choice of interest rate. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Fiscal policy, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E5, E52, E6, E62, E63
Furor over the Fed : Presidential Tweets and Central Bank Independence Staff Analytical Note 2019-33 Antoine Camous, Dmitry Matveev We illustrate how market data can be informative about the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. Federal funds futures are private contracts that reflect investor’s expectations about monetary policy decisions. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Research Topic(s): Central bank research, Credibility, Financial markets, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, E5, E52, E58
A Comprehensive Evaluation of Measures of Core Inflation in Canada: An Update Staff Discussion Paper 2019-9 Helen Lao, Ceciline Steyn We provide an updated evaluation of the value of various measures of core inflation that could be used in the conduct of monetary policy. We find that the Bank of Canada’s current preferred measures of core inflation—CPI-trim, CPI-median and CPI-common—continue to outperform alternative core measures across a range of criteria. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Research Topic(s): Inflation and prices, Monetary policy framework JEL Code(s): E, E3, E31, E5, E52
Financial Frictions, Durable Goods and Monetary Policy Staff Working Paper 2019-31 Ugochi Emenogu, Leo Michelis Financial frictions affect how much consumers spend on durable and non-durable goods. Borrowers can face both loan-to-value (LTV) constraints and payment-to-income (PTI) constraints. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Financial system regulation and policies, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, E5, E52
Central Bank Communication That Works: Lessons from Lab Experiments Staff Working Paper 2019-21 Oleksiy Kryvtsov, Luba Petersen We use controlled laboratory experiments to test the causal effects of central bank communication on economic expectations and to distinguish the underlying mechanisms of those effects. In an experiment where subjects learn to forecast economic variables, we find that central bank communication has a stabilizing effect on individual and aggregate outcomes and that the size of the effect varies with the type of communication. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Monetary policy implementation, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): C, C9, D, D8, D84, E, E3, E5, E52
The Neutral Rate in Canada: 2019 Update Staff Analytical Note 2019-11 Thomas J. Carter, Xin Scott Chen, José Dorich This note provides an update on Bank of Canada staff’s assessment of the Canadian neutral rate. The neutral rate is the policy rate needed to keep output at its potential level and inflation at target once the effects of any cyclical shocks have dissipated. This medium- to long-run concept serves as a benchmark for gauging the degree of monetary stimulus provided by a given policy setting. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Research Topic(s): Economic models, Interest rates, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E4, E40, E43, E5, E50, E52, E58, F, F4, F41
Labor Mobility in a Monetary Union Staff Working Paper 2019-15 Daniela Hauser, Martin Seneca The optimal currency literature has stressed the importance of labor mobility as a precondition for the success of monetary unions. But only a few studies formally link labor mobility to macroeconomic adjustment and policy. In this paper, we study macroeconomic dynamics and optimal monetary policy in an economy with cyclical labor flows across two distinct regions that share trade links and a common monetary framework. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Economic models, Labour markets, Monetary policy framework, Regional economic developments JEL Code(s): E, E3, E32, E5, E52, F, F4
Inflation Targeting and Liquidity Traps Under Endogenous Credibility Staff Working Paper 2019-9 Cars Hommes, Joep Lustenhouwer Policy implications are derived for an inflation-targeting central bank, whose credibility is endogenous and depends on its past ability to achieve its targets. This is done in a New Keynesian framework with heterogeneous and boundedly rational expectations. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Research Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Credibility, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): C, C6, C62, E, E3, E32, E5, E52