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131 Results

Filling in the Blanks: Network Structure and Interbank Contagion

Staff Working Paper 2014-26 Kartik Anand, Ben Craig, Goetz von Peter
The network pattern of financial linkages is important in many areas of banking and finance. Yet bilateral linkages are often unobserved, and maximum entropy serves as the leading method for estimating counterparty exposures.

E-Money: Efficiency, Stability and Optimal Policy

Staff Working Paper 2014-16 Jonathan Chiu, Tsz-Nga Wong
What makes e-money more special than cash? Is the introduction of e-money necessarily welfare enhancing? Is an e-money system necessarily stable? What is the optimal way to design an efficient and stable e-money scheme?
November 14, 2013

Fragmentation in Canadian Equity Markets

Changes in technology and regulation have resulted in an increasing number of trading venues in equity markets in Canada. New trading platforms have intensified price competition and have encouraged innovation, and they do not appear to have segmented trade. But the increasingly complex market structure has necessitated investments in expensive technology and has introduced new operational risks. Regulatory responses should be carefully adapted to retain the competition and innovation associated with this market fragmentation.
November 15, 2012

Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets

Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria.

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