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204 Results

Credit Risk Transfer and Bank Insolvency Risk

Staff Working Paper 2017-59 Maarten van Oordt
The present paper shows that, everything else equal, some transactions to transfer portfolio credit risk to third-party investors increase the insolvency risk of banks. This is particularly likely if a bank sells the senior tranche and retains a sufficiently large first-loss position.

Recent Evolution of Canada’s Credit-to-GDP Gap: Measurement and Interpretation

Staff Analytical Note 2017-25 Timothy Grieder, Dylan Hogg, Thibaut Duprey
Over the past several years, the Bank for International Settlements has noted that Canada’s credit-to-GDP gap has widened and is above thresholds indicating future banking stress.

A Barometer of Canadian Financial System Vulnerabilities

Staff Analytical Note 2017-24 Thibaut Duprey, Tom Roberts
This note presents a composite indicator of Canadian financial system vulnerabilities—the Vulnerabilities Barometer. It aims to complement the Bank of Canada’s vulnerabilities assessment by adding a quantitative and synthesized perspective to the more granular (distributional) analysis presented in the Financial System Review.

What Drives Episodes of Settlement Fails in the Government of Canada Bond Market?

We study settlement fails for trades in the Government of Canada bond market. We find that settlement fails do not occur independently. Using a novel and comprehensive dataset, we examine three drivers of fails.
November 28, 2017

Shoring Up the Foundations for a More Resilient Banking System: The Development of Basel III

The authors trace the development of the Basel III standards for banking regulation. Basel III builds on two earlier frameworks, in response to weaknesses revealed during the global financial crisis. They highlight how implementation of the standards will underpin greater financial stability and provide a sound foundation for economic growth.
November 28, 2017

Analysis of Household Vulnerabilities Using Loan-Level Mortgage Data

This report examines detailed data on home mortgages to provide a better understanding of the vulnerabilities associated with the mortgage market. The proportion of low-ratio mortgages is growing, particularly in regions with strong house price growth. Moreover, these borrowers exhibit less flexibility to adverse shocks, since they have high debt levels relative to income and have taken mortgages with long amortization periods.
November 16, 2017

Acceptance and Use of Payments at the Point of Sale in Canada

Merchants universally accept cash. Consumers widely hold cash but also carry debit and credit cards. The cost of using a method of payment has only a small influence on which method consumers use. Large merchants accept all payments, while only two-thirds of small and medium-sized businesses accept credit cards. Merchants report that credit cards are the costliest payment method compared with cash and debit cards. However, costs are not the only consideration. Merchant acceptance of credit accounts for the many con-sumers that want to use credit cards. This interaction between consumers and merchants is known as network externalities.

The MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework (MFRAF), Version 2.0

Technical Report No. 111 Jose Fique
This report provides a detailed technical description of the updated MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework (MFRAF), which replaces the version described in Gauthier, Souissi and Liu (2014) as the Bank of Canada’s stress-testing model for banks with a focus on domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs).

The Rise of Non-Regulated Financial Intermediaries in the Housing Sector and its Macroeconomic Implications

Staff Working Paper 2017-36 Hélène Desgagnés
I examine the impact of non-regulated lenders in the mortgage market using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. My model features two types of financial intermediaries that differ in three ways: (i) only regulated intermediaries face a capital requirement, (ii) non-regulated intermediaries finance themselves by selling securities and cannot accept deposits, and (iii) non-regulated intermediaries face a more elastic demand.
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