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65 Results

Stress testing central counterparties for resolution planning

The Bank of Canada completed its first resolution plan for the Canadian Derivatives and Clearing Corporation (CDCC) in 2024. To estimate the resolution costs, we apply the extreme value theory method to simulate the credit losses that would result from extreme scenarios where multiple clearing members default at the same time.

The new repo tri-party Canadian Collateral Management Service: Benefits to the financial system and to the Bank of Canada

Staff Analytical Note 2025-6 Philippe Muller, Maksym Padalko
The Canadian Collateral Management Service (CCMS) is a new tri-party collateral management service offered by the TMX Group and Clearstream. CCMS will enhance Canada’s financial infrastructure for securities financing transactions, including for the repurchase, or repo, market that is a core funding market in Canada. We explain the importance of the repo market and describe the benefits of the CCMS for market participants and for the Bank of Canada.

Non-Bank Dealing and Liquidity Bifurcation in Fixed-Income Markets

Staff Working Paper 2025-2 Michael Brolley, David Cimon
We model non-bank entry into fixed-income markets and state-dependent liquidity. Non-bank financial institutions improve liquidity more during normal times than in stress. Banks may become less reliable to marginal clients, exacerbating the difference in liquidity between normal and stressed times. Central bank lending during stress may limit this harmful division.

The International Exposure of the Canadian Banking System

In 2023, the share of Canadian banks’ foreign assets and liabilities amounted to around 50%. While Canadian banks engage domestically mostly with households and non-financial corporations, their most common counterparties abroad are non-bank financial institutions.

How foreign central banks can affect liquidity in the Government of Canada bond market

Staff Analytical Note 2024-26 Patrick Aldridge, Jabir Sandhu, Sofia Tchamova
We find that foreign central banks own a large share of Government of Canada (GoC) bonds and tend to hold their positions for longer than other types of asset managers. This buy-and-hold behaviour could offer benefits. For example, foreign central banks may be less likely than other asset managers to sell bonds and add to strains on market liquidity in periods of turmoil. However, foreign central banks’ buy-and-hold behaviour combined with their minimal lending of GoC bonds in securities-financing markets, as observed in our available data, can potentially lower liquidity because fewer GoC bonds are available for others to transact in secondary markets. Indeed, we find that higher levels of foreign central banks’ GoC bond holdings are related to lower liquidity.

Could all-to-all trading improve liquidity in the Government of Canada bond market?

Staff Analytical Note 2024-17 Jabir Sandhu, Rishi Vala
We find that on any given day, nearly half of Government of Canada bond transactions by clients of dealers can be offset with other clients, including during the turmoil in March 2020. Our results show that under certain conditions clients could potentially trade directly with each other and are a step towards understanding the relevance of broader all-to-all trading in the Government of Canada bond market.

How big is cash-futures basis trading in Canada’s government bond market?

Staff Analytical Note 2024-16 Andreas Uthemann, Rishi Vala
Cash-futures basis trading has grown alongside the Government of Canada bond futures market. We examine this growth over time in relation to Government of Canada bond and repurchase agreement markets and provide details on the type of market participants that engage in this type of trading activity.

Non-bank financial intermediation: Canada’s submission to the 2023 global monitoring report

Staff Analytical Note 2024-15 Malcolm Fisher, Alan Walsh
We share insights from Canadian data from 2002 to 2022 that the Bank of Canada collected. The Bank submits these data each year to the Financial Stability Board for inclusion in its Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Research Topic(s): Financial institutions, Sectoral balance sheet JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G22, G23

Central Bank Liquidity Policy in Modern Times

Staff Discussion Paper 2024-6 Skylar Brooks
Across several dimensions of lender of last resort policy, I highlight broad changes that have occurred since the 2008–09 global financial crisis and discuss some of the key challenges, choices and considerations facing the designers of central bank liquidity tools today.

Fire Sales and Liquidity Requirements

Staff Working Paper 2024-18 Yuteng Cheng, Roberto Robatto
We study liquidity requirements in a framework with fire sales. The framework nests three common pricing mechanisms and produces the same observables. Absent risk-sharing considerations, the equilibrium is efficient with cash-in-the-market pricing; a liquidity requirement is optimal with second-best-use pricing; and a liquidity ceiling (i.e., a cap on liquid assets) is optimal with adverse selection.
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