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We examine the Canadian money market fund (MMF) sector and find that it has grown rapidly, holding a large share of treasury bills and commercial paper. Unlike in some other jurisdictions where investor outflows likely amplified stresses, Canadian MMFs experienced inflows during the March 2020 market turmoil.

This paper studies how financial shocks shape the distribution of output growth by introducing a quantile-augmented vector autoregression (QAVAR), which integrates quantile regressions into a structural VAR framework. The QAVAR preserves standard shock identification while delivering flexible, nonparametric forecasts of conditional moments and tail risk measures for gross domestic product.

A flash loan is a special type of uncollateralized loan with zero default risk. I document the use for flash loans across major blockchains that are Ethereum-Virtual-Machine-compatible. Flash loans expand access to liquidity, and highly sophisticated actors use them for many practical applications.

We consider ways central banks could adapt in the event of an increased risk of a dash for cash from asset managers. We explore ideas such as new facilities that ease asset managers’ ability to convert existing assets to cash or new assets with liquidity that central banks would guarantee.

We consider ways central banks could adapt in the event of an increased risk of a dash for cash from asset managers. We explore ideas such as new facilities that ease asset managers’ ability to convert existing assets to cash or new assets with liquidity that central banks would guarantee.

In 2024, the Bank of Canada reviewed and updated its Contingent Term Repo Facility policy, incorporating lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic and other global market developments, such as the UK gilt crisis in September 2022. This paper accompanies the March 17, 2025, Contingent Term Repo Facility market notice and provides background information and further details about the design of the revised policy.

Can regulators keep pace with banks’ creative regulatory workarounds? Our analysis unpacks the trade-offs between fixed regulations and crisis-triggered rules, showing that the latter are especially prone to circumvention—and can trigger larger, costlier bailouts.

We draw on the Canadian experience to examine how monetary and macroprudential policies interact and possibly complement each other in achieving their respective price and financial stability objectives.

We find that foreign central banks own a large share of Government of Canada (GoC) bonds and tend to hold their positions for longer than other types of asset managers. This buy-and-hold behaviour could offer benefits. For example, foreign central banks may be less likely than other asset managers to sell bonds and add to strains on market liquidity in periods of turmoil. However, foreign central banks’ buy-and-hold behaviour combined with their minimal lending of GoC bonds in securities-financing markets, as observed in our available data, can potentially lower liquidity because fewer GoC bonds are available for others to transact in secondary markets. Indeed, we find that higher levels of foreign central banks’ GoC bond holdings are related to lower liquidity.

We find that on any given day, nearly half of Government of Canada bond transactions by clients of dealers can be offset with other clients, including during the turmoil in March 2020. Our results show that under certain conditions clients could potentially trade directly with each other and are a step towards understanding the relevance of broader all-to-all trading in the Government of Canada bond market.