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Many countries prohibit large shareholdings in their domestic banks.The authors examine whether such a restriction restrains competition in a duopolistic loan market. Blockholders may influence managers' output decisions by choosing capital structure, as in Brander and Lewis (1986).

This paper jointly relaxes two assumptions in the literature that estimates games. These two assumptions are the parametric restriction on the model primitives and the restriction of equilibrium behaviors. Without imposing the above two assumptions, this paper identifies the primitives of the game.

What makes e-money more special than cash? Is the introduction of e-money necessarily welfare enhancing? Is an e-money system necessarily stable? What is the optimal way to design an efficient and stable e-money scheme?

We study the formation of price bubbles on experimental asset markets where cash earns interest. There are two main conclusions.

This paper studies the effects of monetary policy in an inventory theoretic model of money demand. In this model, agents keep inventories of money, despite the fact that money is dominated in rate of return by interest bearing assets, because they must pay a fixed cost to transfer funds between the asset market and the goods market.

We explore the idea that the financial sector can be a source of non-fundamental risk to the rest of the economy. We also consider whether policy can be used to reduce this risk—either by increasing the supply of publicly backed safe assets or by reducing the demand for safe assets.

Observed high-frequency prices are contaminated with liquidity costs or market microstructure noise. Using such data, we derive a new asset return variance estimator inspired by the market microstructure literature to explicitly model the noise and remove it from observed returns before estimating their variance.

This paper studies exchange rate dynamics by incorporating bounded rationality, that is, limited foresight, in a small open-economy model. This behavior of limited foresight helps explain several observations and puzzles in the data of exchange rate movements.

A regulator would want to restrict dividends to force banks to rebuild capital during a crisis. But such a policy is not time-consistent. A time-consistent policy would let banks gradually rebuild capital and pay dividends even when their equity remains below pre-crisis levels.

We build a network formation game of firms with trade flows to study the adoption and usage of a new digital currency as an alternative to correspondent banking.