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Market power and pass-through of cost and demand shocks are studied in a market with free entry of heterogeneous firms and consumer mixed search. Equilibrium prices and markups are driven by variation in the elasticity of demand across firms. Improved conditions for buyers can either raise or lower market power.

We model the asset-opacity choice of an intermediary subject to rollover risk in wholesale funding markets. Greater opacity means investors form more dispersed beliefs about an intermediary’s profitability.

Understanding the size of sectoral links is crucial to predicting the impact of a crisis on the whole economy. We show that statistical learning techniques substantially outperform traditional estimation techniques when measuring large networks of these links.

This paper studies how unsecured consumer credit impacts the extent to which unemployment insurance (UI) policies smooth aggregate consumption fluctuations over the business cycle. Using a general equilibrium real business cycle model, I find that unsecured credit amplifies the extent to which UI smooths cyclical consumption fluctuations.

Recessions feature elevated uncertainty. We develop a nonlinear imperfect-information New Keynesian model where procyclical information quality generates endogenous countercyclical uncertainty and precautionary saving. This demand channel can overturn the inflationary impact of negative supply shocks, making them deflationary, unless monetary policy stabilizes the output gap.

In a dynamic model with limited commitment, aggregate payout-based compensation induces managers to raise outside equity yet invest too little today. Per-share compensation eliminates the dilution motive and restores efficient investment, but it does so through slower capital accumulation that better protects incumbent shareholder value.

We explore the idea that the financial sector can be a source of non-fundamental risk to the rest of the economy. We also consider whether policy can be used to reduce this risk—either by increasing the supply of publicly backed safe assets or by reducing the demand for safe assets.

Many central banks are considering issuing a central bank digital currency (CBDC). This would introduce a new policy tool—interest on CBDC. We investigate how this new tool would interact with traditional monetary policy tools, such as the interest on central bank reserves.

We document a new empirical finding in the foreign exchange market: currency returns show systematic reversals around the benchmark fixings. Specifically, the US dollar, on average, appreciates in the hours before fixes and depreciates after fixes.

This paper considers an economy where central-bank-issued fiat money competes with privately issued e-money. We study a policy-setting game between the central bank and the e-money issuer and find (1) the optimal monetary policy of the central bank depends on the policy of the private issuer and may deviate from the Friedman rule; (2) multiple equilibria may exist; (3) when the economy approaches a cashless state, the central bank’s optimal policy improves the market power of the e-money issuer and can lead to a discrete decrease in welfare and a discrete increase in inflation; and (4) first best cannot be achieved.