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This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models.

Using micro data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey and Current Population Survey, I document that government spending shocks affect individuals differently over the life cycle.

A large-scale reduction in mortgage principal can strengthen a recovery, support house prices and lower foreclosures. The nature of the intervention shapes its impact, which rests on how resources are redistributed across households. The availability of bankruptcy on unsecured debt changes the response to large-scale mortgage relief by reducing precautionary savings.

This paper develops a stress-testing framework in which banks strategically adjust their balance sheets in response to regulatory constraints and market conditions. Applied to Canada’s largest banks, it quantifies the effects of macroprudential policies on lending and identifies systemic vulnerabilities through reverse stress testing.

A regulator would want to restrict dividends to force banks to rebuild capital during a crisis. But such a policy is not time-consistent. A time-consistent policy would let banks gradually rebuild capital and pay dividends even when their equity remains below pre-crisis levels.

In a dynamic model with limited commitment, aggregate payout-based compensation induces managers to raise outside equity yet invest too little today. Per-share compensation eliminates the dilution motive and restores efficient investment, but it does so through slower capital accumulation that better protects incumbent shareholder value.

This paper considers an economy where central-bank-issued fiat money competes with privately issued e-money. We study a policy-setting game between the central bank and the e-money issuer and find (1) the optimal monetary policy of the central bank depends on the policy of the private issuer and may deviate from the Friedman rule; (2) multiple equilibria may exist; (3) when the economy approaches a cashless state, the central bank’s optimal policy improves the market power of the e-money issuer and can lead to a discrete decrease in welfare and a discrete increase in inflation; and (4) first best cannot be achieved.

The current monetary policy framework of the Fed intends to be more ’inclusive’ by running the economy hot for longer during expansions.

We develop and estimate a search model in which identical consumers trade with price-setting firms that differ in productivity. We use the estimated model to characterize the qualitative and quantitative differences in prices and markups across firms. We explore how individual firms respond to changes in cost and demand and how they pass these through to their prices and markup.

This paper studies how the allocation of residual losses affects trading and welfare in a central counterparty. I compare loss sharing under two loss-allocation mechanisms – variation margin haircutting and cash calls – and study the privately and socially optimal degree of loss sharing.