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485 Results

Identification and Estimation of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions with Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity

Staff working paper 2016-23 Serafin Grundl, Yu Zhu
This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models.

From Stress to Strategy: How Banks Balance the Scales

Staff working paper 2026-26 Ruben Hipp, Javier Ojea Ferreiro
This paper develops a stress-testing framework in which banks strategically adjust their balance sheets in response to regulatory constraints and market conditions. Applied to Canada’s largest banks, it quantifies the effects of macroprudential policies on lending and identifies systemic vulnerabilities through reverse stress testing.

Estimating Large-Dimensional Connectedness Tables: The Great Moderation Through the Lens of Sectoral Spillovers

Staff working paper 2021-37 Felix Brunner, Ruben Hipp
Understanding the size of sectoral links is crucial to predicting the impact of a crisis on the whole economy. We show that statistical learning techniques substantially outperform traditional estimation techniques when measuring large networks of these links.

Fiscal Stimulus and Skill Accumulation over the Life Cycle

Staff working paper 2023-9 Laure Simon
Using micro data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey and Current Population Survey, I document that government spending shocks affect individuals differently over the life cycle.

Should Banks Be Worried About Dividend Restrictions?

Staff working paper 2023-49 Josef Schroth
A regulator would want to restrict dividends to force banks to rebuild capital during a crisis. But such a policy is not time-consistent. A time-consistent policy would let banks gradually rebuild capital and pay dividends even when their equity remains below pre-crisis levels.

A Framework for Analyzing Monetary Policy in an Economy with E-money

Staff working paper 2019-1 Yu Zhu, Scott Hendry
This paper considers an economy where central-bank-issued fiat money competes with privately issued e-money. We study a policy-setting game between the central bank and the e-money issuer and find (1) the optimal monetary policy of the central bank depends on the policy of the private issuer and may deviate from the Friedman rule; (2) multiple equilibria may exist; (3) when the economy approaches a cashless state, the central bank’s optimal policy improves the market power of the e-money issuer and can lead to a discrete decrease in welfare and a discrete increase in inflation; and (4) first best cannot be achieved.

Monetary Policy Under Okun’s Hypothesis

Staff working paper 2026-3 Felipe Alves, Giovanni L. Violante
The current monetary policy framework of the Fed intends to be more ’inclusive’ by running the economy hot for longer during expansions.

Time-Inconsistent Manager Incentives and Capital Formation

In a dynamic model with limited commitment, aggregate payout-based compensation induces managers to raise outside equity yet invest too little today. Per-share compensation eliminates the dilution motive and restores efficient investment, but it does so through slower capital accumulation that better protects incumbent shareholder value.

Technology Adoption in Input-Output Networks

Staff working paper 2019-51 Xintong Han, Lei Xu
We study how input-output networks affect the speed of technology adoption. In particular, we model the decision to adopt the programming language Python 3 by software packages. Python 3 provides advanced features but is not backward compatible with Python 2, which implies it comes with adoption costs.

To Share or Not to Share? Uncovered Losses in a Derivatives Clearinghouse

Staff working paper 2016-4 Radoslav Raykov
This paper studies how the allocation of residual losses affects trading and welfare in a central counterparty. I compare loss sharing under two loss-allocation mechanisms – variation margin haircutting and cash calls – and study the privately and socially optimal degree of loss sharing.
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