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The Bank of Canada 2015 Retailer Survey on the Cost of Payment Methods faced low response rates and outliers in sample data for two of its retailer strata: chains and large independent businesses. This technical report investigates whether it is appropriate to combine these two strata to produce more accurate estimates of the total private cost to large businesses of the main payment methods.

Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker.

In 2005, the Bank of Canada celebrated its 70th anniversary. Since the Bank opened its doors in March 1935, it has evolved into a national institution at the heart of Canada’s economy. We had a lot to celebrate in 2005—particularly our progress over the past 70 yearsand our continuing contribution to the economic and financial well-being of Canadians.

The author introduces a central counterparty (CCP) into a model of a repo market. Without the CCP, there exist multiple equilibria in the model. In one of the equilibria, a repo market emerges as bond dealers and cash investors choose to arrange repos in an over-the-counter bond market.

The author reviews the theoretical and empirical literature to examine the traditional perception that the following trade-off exists between economic efficiency and stability in the banking system: a competitive banking system is more efficient and therefore important to growth, but market power is necessary for stability in the banking system.

Stock market fundamentals would not seem to meaningfully predict returns over a shorter-term horizon—instead, I shift focus to severe downside risk (i.e., crashes).

We investigate the effect of inflation on output and welfare in the laboratory. Consistent with monetary theory, we find that inflation acts as a tax on monetary exchange and reduces output and welfare.

Central banks play a pivotal role in well-functioning payments systems by providing liquidity via collateralized lending. This article discusses the role of collateral and haircut policy in central bank lending, as well as the distinguishing features of the central bank’s policy relative to private sector practices. It presents a model that explicitly incorporates the unique role of central banks in the payments system and argues that central banks must consider how their haircut policies affect the relative price and liquidity of assets, the market’s asset allocation, and the likelihood of participants to default. Furthermore, under extraordinary circumstances, there is a rationale for the central bank to temporarily reduce haircuts or broaden the list of eligible collateral to mitigate the shortage of liquidity in the market.

We propose a drifting-coefficient model to empirically study the effect of money on output growth in Canada and to examine the role of prevailing financial conditions for that relationship. We show that such a time-varying approach can be a useful way of modelling the impact of money on growth, and can partly reconcile the lack of concensus in the literature on the question of whether money affects growth.

We estimate an aggregate elasticity of substitution between capital and labor near or below one, which implies that capital deepening cannot explain the global decline in labor's share. Our methodology derives from transition paths in the neo-classical growth model.