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2166 Results

December 17, 2000

Dynamic General-Equilibrium Models and Why the Bank of Canada is Interested in Them

Dynamic general-equilibrium models (DGEMs) are being increasingly used in macroeconomic research. In this article, the author describes the main features of these models and outlines their contribution to economic research performed at the Bank of Canada. He notes that the basic principle of DGEMs is that the modelling of economic activity, even on a scale as large as the economy of a country, should start with a series of microeconomic problems (at the scale of individuals), which, once resolved, are aggregated to represent the macroeconomic reality described by the model.

What to Expect When China Liberalizes Its Capital Account

Staff discussion paper 2016-10 Mark Kruger, Gurnain Pasricha
When China joined the World Trade Organization in December 2001, it marked a watershed for the world economy. Ten years from now, the opening of China’s capital account and the financial integration that will unfold will be viewed as a milestone of similar importance.

A Framework for Analyzing Monetary Policy in an Economy with E-money

Staff working paper 2019-1 Yu Zhu, Scott Hendry
This paper considers an economy where central-bank-issued fiat money competes with privately issued e-money. We study a policy-setting game between the central bank and the e-money issuer and find (1) the optimal monetary policy of the central bank depends on the policy of the private issuer and may deviate from the Friedman rule; (2) multiple equilibria may exist; (3) when the economy approaches a cashless state, the central bank’s optimal policy improves the market power of the e-money issuer and can lead to a discrete decrease in welfare and a discrete increase in inflation; and (4) first best cannot be achieved.

Flight from Safety: How a Change to the Deposit Insurance Limit Affects Households’ Portfolio Allocation

Staff working paper 2019-29 H. Evren Damar, Reint Gropp, Adi Mordel
Deposit insurance protects depositors from failing banks, thus making insured deposits risk-free. When a deposit insurance limit is increased, some deposits that previously were uninsured become insured, thereby increasing the share of risk-free assets in households’ portfolios. This increase cannot simply be undone by households, because to invest in uninsured deposits, a household must first invest in insured deposits up to the limit. This basic insight is the starting point of the analysis in this paper.

Total factor productivity growth projection for Canada: A sectoral approach

Staff analytical note 2024-12 Dany Brouillette, Tessa Devakos, Raven Wheesk
We propose a tool that decomposes TFP growth into sectoral contributions. The analysis incorporates three structural factors—digitalization, aging and climate change policies—and measures their contributions. Overall, we expect that aggregate TFP growth will slow down in the 2020s below both its historical average and the average from the 2010s.

Privacy in CBDC technology

Staff analytical note 2020-9 Sriram Darbha, Rakesh Arora
Privacy is a key aspect of a potential central bank digital currency system. We outline different technical choices to enact various privacy models while complying with the appropriate regulations. We develop a framework to evaluate privacy models and list key risks and trade-offs in privacy design.

A Horse Race of Monetary Policy Regimes: An Experimental Investigation

Staff working paper 2022-33 Olena Kostyshyna, Luba Petersen, Jing Yang
How should central banks design monetary policy in stable times and during recessions? We run a horse race between five monetary policy frameworks in an experimental laboratory to assess how well the different approaches can manage the public’s expectations and stabilize the economy.

Bank Screening Heterogeneity

Staff working paper 2016-56 Thibaut Duprey
Production efficiency and financial stability do not necessarily go hand in hand. With heterogeneity in banks’ abilities to screen borrowers, the market for loans becomes segmented and a self-competition mechanism arises. When heterogeneity increases, the intensive and extensive margins have opposite effects.
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