Search

We identify the drivers of unsecured and collateralized loan volumes, rates and haircuts in Canada using the Bayesian model averaging approach to deal with model uncertainty. Our results suggest that the key friction driving behaviour in this market is the collateral reallocation cost faced by borrowers.

The U.S. recovery from the Great Recession has been slow relative to other postwar-era recoveries in the United States. Encouraged by loose lending standards in the pre-crisis period, U.S. households took on unsustainable amounts of debt, making them vulnerable to adverse shocks. Subsequently, a considerable drop in asset prices forced households to repair their balance sheets. While there has been progress in household deleveraging, the government sector now needs to delever, which will restrain growth over the next few years.

This paper presents a model of strategic buyer-seller networks with information exchange between sellers. Prior to engaging in bargaining with buyers, sellers can share access to buyers for a negotiated transfer. We study how this information exchange affects overall market prices, volumes and welfare, given different initial market conditions and information sharing rules.

Many important economic variables are subject to revision. This article explains how, when, and why such revisions occur; how revisions to Canadian gross domestic product (GDP) compare with GDP revisions in some other countries; which GDP components are subject to the largest revisions; and how data revisions can affect policy decisions. The author finds that revisions to Canadian GDP tend to be smaller, on average, than those of some other countries, and that among the GDP components, exports and imports are most heavily revised.

We propose a tool that decomposes TFP growth into sectoral contributions. The analysis incorporates three structural factors—digitalization, aging and climate change policies—and measures their contributions. Overall, we expect that aggregate TFP growth will slow down in the 2020s below both its historical average and the average from the 2010s.

Following the recent financial crisis, major central banks have introduced several types of unconventional monetary policy measures, including liquidity and credit facilities, asset purchases and forward guidance. To date, these measures appear to have been successful. They restored market functioning, facilitated the transmission of monetary policy and supported economic activity. They have potential costs, however, including challenges related to the greatly expanded balance sheets of central banks and the eventual exit from these measures, as well as the vulnerabilities that can arise from prolonged monetary accommodation.

This paper considers an economy where central-bank-issued fiat money competes with privately issued e-money. We study a policy-setting game between the central bank and the e-money issuer and find (1) the optimal monetary policy of the central bank depends on the policy of the private issuer and may deviate from the Friedman rule; (2) multiple equilibria may exist; (3) when the economy approaches a cashless state, the central bank’s optimal policy improves the market power of the e-money issuer and can lead to a discrete decrease in welfare and a discrete increase in inflation; and (4) first best cannot be achieved.

In the past few years, many have postulated that the possible disinflationary effects of digitalization could explain the subdued inflation in advanced economies. In this note, we review the evidence found in the literature. We look at three main channels.

Raising liquidity when funding is stressed creates pressure on the financial market. Liquidating large quantities of assets depresses their prices and may amplify funding shocks. How do banks weathering a funding crisis contribute to contagion risk?

How much capital do banks need as a buffer to absorb severe shocks? By using historical stock market data, market-based stress tests help estimate the magnitude of capital buffers necessary to absorb severe but plausible shocks.