Search

Content Types

Subjects

Authors

Research Themes

JEL Codes

Sources

Published After

Published Before

2191 Results

Occasionally Binding Constraints in Large Models: A Review of Solution Methods

Staff discussion paper 2021-5 Jonathan Swarbrick
Solving macroeconomic models is difficult. One challenge is the occasionally binding constraint of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. This paper reviews various ways to solve models that include this feature.

Bank Screening Heterogeneity

Staff working paper 2016-56 Thibaut Duprey
Production efficiency and financial stability do not necessarily go hand in hand. With heterogeneity in banks’ abilities to screen borrowers, the market for loans becomes segmented and a self-competition mechanism arises. When heterogeneity increases, the intensive and extensive margins have opposite effects.
March 9, 2010

Inflation Expectations and the Conduct of Monetary Policy: A Review of Recent Evidence and Experience

This article explores the role of inflation expectations in the conduct of monetary policy. It reviews the various measures of inflation expectations used by central banks, including surveys and market-based indicators, and considers their advantages and disadvantages. It examines the critical role of inflation expectations in the framework that central banks use to understand, forecast, and control inflation. It also looks at their role as an indicator of central bank credibility. The behaviour of inflation expectations over the past two years is analyzed and policy conclusions are offered.

Privacy in CBDC technology

Staff analytical note 2020-9 Sriram Darbha, Rakesh Arora
Privacy is a key aspect of a potential central bank digital currency system. We outline different technical choices to enact various privacy models while complying with the appropriate regulations. We develop a framework to evaluate privacy models and list key risks and trade-offs in privacy design.

Reconciling Jaimovich-Rebelo Preferences, Habit in Consumption and Labor Supply

Staff working paper 2018-26 Tom D. Holden, Paul Levine, Jonathan Swarbrick
This note studies a form of a utility function of consumption with habit and leisure that (a) is compatible with long-run balanced growth, (b) hits a steady-state observed target for hours worked and (c) is consistent with micro-econometric evidence for the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
October 26, 2018

Staff economic projections

These forecasts are provided to Governing Council in preparation for monetary policy decisions. They are released once a year with a five-year lag.

Canadian Bank Notes and Dominion Notes: Lessons for Digital Currencies

Staff working paper 2017-5 Ben Fung, Scott Hendry, Warren E. Weber
This paper studies the period in Canada when both private bank notes and government-issued notes (Dominion notes) were simultaneously in circulation. Because both of these notes shared many of the characteristics of today's digital currencies, the experience with these notes can be used to draw lessons about how digital currencies might perform.

What COVID-19 May Leave Behind: Technology-Related Job Postings in Canada

Staff working paper 2022-17 Alejandra Bellatin, Gabriela Galassi
COVID-19 affects technology adoption: online job postings for technology-related occupations fall less during pandemic lockdowns and pick up faster during reopenings than postings for more traditional occupations.

A Framework for Analyzing Monetary Policy in an Economy with E-money

Staff working paper 2019-1 Yu Zhu, Scott Hendry
This paper considers an economy where central-bank-issued fiat money competes with privately issued e-money. We study a policy-setting game between the central bank and the e-money issuer and find (1) the optimal monetary policy of the central bank depends on the policy of the private issuer and may deviate from the Friedman rule; (2) multiple equilibria may exist; (3) when the economy approaches a cashless state, the central bank’s optimal policy improves the market power of the e-money issuer and can lead to a discrete decrease in welfare and a discrete increase in inflation; and (4) first best cannot be achieved.
Go To Page